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ARTICLES 
SAVING CHARITABLE SETTLEMENTS 
Christine P. Bartholomew* 
 
This Article defies the conventional wisdom that all charitable 
distributions from a class action settlement fund are types of cy pres.  
Instead, it proposes a radical delineation between “cy pres remainders” 
(meaning settlement funds left over after individual monetary distributions) 
and “charitable settlements” (meaning money initially distributed to 
charities as part of class action settlements).  While both have cy pres roots, 
these two settlement structures have been conflated, jeopardizing the 
potential utility of charitable settlements.  After articulating more precise 
nomenclature for these distinct distribution methods, this Article justifies 
why we must preserve charitable settlements.  This defense is particularly 
timely, as charitable settlements face growing attacks spurred by Chief 
Justice Roberts‟s comments in the 2014 Marek v. Lane appeal.  Once 
unchained from the strictures of the cy pres doctrine, charitable settlements 
become a tool to promote the larger regulatory objectives underlying class 
action procedures, including access to justice and deterrence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The next frontier of class action reform pits a legal favorite against a 
legal villain.  Charities have long been judicial darlings.1  By contrast, 
recent decisions demonstrate a clear disdain for class actions2 and the 
lawyers who bring them.3  The two intersect in charitable class action 
settlements, often called cy pres. 
Charitable distributions equitably solve settlement disbursement 
problems, particularly in cases where administrative costs exceed individual 
compensation.4  Take, for example, a small-stakes class action settlement 
where individual class members stand to recover $3.  Because some class 
members are difficult to locate or forego making claims, significant 
settlement funds may be leftover.  What should be done with the money?  
To date, the standard solution is to distribute the remainder to a non-profit 
or charity.  In approving such distributions, courts use the cy pres doctrine, 
an equitable concept that allows a court to modify trust funds used for a 
specific charitable purpose when the trust is no longer viable.5 
 
 1. See, e.g., Wooton v. Fitz-Gerald, 440 S.W.2d 719, 726 (Tex. App. 1969) 
(―[C]harities are favorites of the law.‖); see also In re Farrow, 602 A.2d 1346, 1348 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1992). 
 2. See, e.g., Muehler v. Land O‘Lakes, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1370, 1375 (D. Minn. 1985) 
(―The judiciary have not always been receptive to creative and efficient ways to vindicate the 
rights of large groups of victims.  We have now seen that many judges openly and on the 
record have suspicion and disdain for class actions as a means of redress.‖); Jean 
Macchiaroli Eggen, The Synergy of Toxic Tort Law and Public Health:  Lessons from a 
Century of Cigarettes, 41 CONN. L. REV. 561, 606 (2008) (discussing how current class 
action reform ―demonstrate[s] the suspicion and even disdain with which the class action 
device is viewed in some circles‖). 
 3. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff‟s Attorney:  The Implications of 
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 671–72 n.3 (1986) (―[I]t is interesting to note the frequency with which 
judicial opinions favoring new restrictions on the availability of class actions or other 
remedies criticize the plaintiff‘s attorney.‖); J. Thomas Rosch, Comm‘r, FTC, Promoting 
Innovation:  Just How ―Dynamic‖ Should Antitrust Law Be? 19 (Mar. 23, 2010) (discussing 
how ―recent Supreme Court precedent . . . has shown a disdain for the private class action 
bar‖). 
 4. See, e.g., Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 119 F.3d 703, 706 (8th Cir. 1997); In re 
―Agent Orange‖ Prods. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 841 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Wells 
Fargo Secs. Litig., 991 F. Supp. 1193, 1194 (N.D. Cal. 1998). See generally RACHAEL P. 
MULHERON, THE MODERN CY-PRÈS DOCTRINE:  APPLICATIONS & IMPLICATIONS 215–52 
(2006) (discussing the application of cy pres in the class action context). 
 5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003). 
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Now, take a slightly different scenario.  What if the parties anticipated 
the low claims rate from the outset?  Since the administrative costs for 
distributing settlements often range from $5 to $10 per class member, such 
costs could exhaust a substantial portion of the settlement fund.  To solve 
this problem, the parties negotiate a settlement agreement that from its 
inception distributes the money to a related charity or non-profit. 
This type of settlement is now in jeopardy.  Just last term, in Marek v. 
Lane6—an appeal stemming from a class action over Facebook‘s 
―Sponsored Stories‖ feature—Chief Justice Roberts signaled his interest in 
removing such settlements from the judicial toolkit.  The appeal challenged 
a settlement directing Facebook to distribute $6.5 million to create a non-
profit organization that provides online privacy education.7  Because of 
settlement pay-out complications,8 the distribution was in lieu of any 
monetary payment to class members.9  After approval from the trial court10 
and Ninth Circuit,11 objectors appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.12 
The Supreme Court denied the appeal13 but not before Justice Roberts 
used the petition to issue a public statement against charitable class action 
settlements.14  Such a statement accompanying a certification denial is 
rare—particularly for Justice Roberts.15  Justice Roberts described what he 
characterized as the ―disconcerting feature[]‖ of the settlement.16  Citing 
legal scholarship critical of class actions,17 Justice Roberts left little doubt 
about his skepticism of such settlements, noting his 
fundamental concerns surrounding the use of such remedies in class 
action litigation, including when, if ever, such relief should be considered; 
how to assess its fairness as a general matter; whether new entities may be 
established as part of such relief; if not, how existing entities should be 
 
 6. 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013). 
 7. Id. at 8–9. 
 8. Id. at 9. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Lane v. Facebook, Inc., No. C 08–3845 RS, 2010 WL 9013059 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 
2010). 
 11. Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2012), reh‟g en banc denied, 
709 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 12. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Marek, 134 S. Ct. 8 (No. 13-136). 
 13. Marek, 134 S. Ct. at 8. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Robert M. Yablon, Justice Sotomayer and the Supreme Court‟s Certiorari Process, 
123 YALE L.J. F. 551, 551–52 (2014) (noting such statements are issued just a ―handful of 
times each year,‖ most frequently by Justice Sotomayor, not Justice Roberts). 
 16. Marek, 134 S. Ct. at 9. 
 17. Id. (citing Martin H. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern 
Class Action:  A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617, 653–56 (2010) 
[hereinafter Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief]).  Professor Martin Redish has published numerous 
works critical of class action mechanisms. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE 
JUSTICE:  CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 
(2009); Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty:  Rethinking the 
Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 71 
(suggesting class actions are ―judicial blackmail‖); see also Jay Tidmarsh, Superiority As 
Unity, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 565, 568 (2013) (describing Redish‘s significant contributions to 
legal scholarship on class actions). 
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selected; what the respective roles of the judge and parties are in shaping 
a cy pres remedy; how closely the goals of any enlisted organization must 
correspond to the interests of the class; and so on. This Court has not 
previously addressed any of these issues.18 
Roberts‘s shot across the bow is hardly the first attack on class actions.  
Procedural gatekeeping in class actions is on the rise.19  Private 
enforcement of business torts is significantly more difficult than a decade 
ago.20  However, the ―open invitation for objectors to bring a better case 
before the court‖ is the Court‘s first strike at class actions‘ settlement 
approval stage.21 
Given the Facebook settlement in Lane and Roberts‘s accompanying call 
to arms, questions about charitable class action settlements are ripe for 
scholarly examination.22  To date, however, no scholarship or jurisprudence 
has distinguished between various charitable distribution structures; instead, 
the trend is to conflate multiple, distinct methods under the generic rubric of 
cy pres.23 
Scholars and the judiciary have explored arguments for and against cy 
pres remainders, i.e., charitable distributions of leftover settlement funds.24  
 
 18. Marek, 134 S. Ct. at 9.   
 19. Christine P. Bartholomew, Death by Daubert:  The Continued Attack on Private 
Antitrust, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2147, 2163 (2014) (discussing increased procedural 
gatekeeping in class actions); Sheldon Whitehouse, Restoring the Civil Jury‟s Role in the 
Structure of Our Government, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1241, 1261 (2014) (―[Justice] 
Roberts[‘s] Court decisions have also restricted access to class action litigation.‖); Scott 
Dodson, Squeezing Class Actions, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 30, 2011, 3:35 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/squeezing-class-actions/. 
 20. Myriam Gilles & Anthony Sebok, Crowd-Classing Individual Arbitrations in a Post-
Class Action Era, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 447, 457 (2014) (―Over the past decade, the Supreme 
Court and a number of influential circuit courts have revealed deep-seated skepticism (and 
hostility) to class action litigation, finding doctrinal and policy-based rationales to support 
cutting back on this potent procedural device.‖); see also Dodson, supra note 19 (―The 
Supreme Court‘s 2010 Term in particular evinces both skepticism of and hostility 
to class actions.‖). 
 21. Daniel Fisher, Roberts Puts Cy Pres Settlements in Crosshairs As He Lets Facebook 
Pact Pass, FORBES (Nov. 5, 2013, 9:43 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/ 
2013/11/05/roberts-puts-cy-pres-settlements-in-crosshairs-as-he-lets-facebook-pact-pass/. 
 22. Partly in response to Justice Roberts‘s concerns, the Federal Rules Advisory 
Committee‘s Subcommittee on Rule 23 recently circulated a draft amendment to Rule 23 to 
address cy pres distributions. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, RULE 23 
SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 264 (2015), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2015-04.pdf. 
 23. See generally Wilber H. Boies & Latonia Haney Keith, Class Action Settlement 
Residue and Cy Pres Awards:  Emerging Problems and Practical Solutions, 21 VA. J. SOC. 
POL‘Y & L. 267, 269–70 (2014); Natalie A. DeJarlais, The Consumer Trust Fund:  A Cy Pres 
Solution to Undistributed Funds in Consumer Class Actions, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 729 (1987); 
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043, 
2080 (2010); Jennifer Johnston, Cy Pres Comme Possible to Anything Is Possible:  How Cy 
Pres Creates Improper Incentives in Class Action Settlements, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL‘Y 277, 
290 (2013); Kerry Barnett, Note, Equitable Trusts:  An Effective Remedy in Consumer Class 
Actions, 96 YALE L.J. 1591 (1987). 
 24. See, e.g., Boies & Keith, supra note 23, at 269–70; DeJarlais, supra note 23; 
Fitzpatrick, supra note 23, at 2080; Johnston, supra note 23, at 290; Barnett, supra note 23, 
at 1596–1600.  In fact, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee has recognized the debate and is 
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However, distributions as in Lane, where an earmarked portion of a 
settlement went to a charity, have yet to be specifically analyzed.  In this 
particular form, settlements are consciously structured for exclusive 
distribution to third parties:  charitable distributions are not reserved for 
unclaimed funds but instead substitute for distributions to class members.25  
This Article coins a new term—―charitable settlements‖—to describe such 
distributions. 
Distinguishing between cy pres remainders and charitable settlements is 
not merely an exercise in semantics.  Charitable settlement challenges raise 
basic questions about whether the purpose of a damages class action is 
compensation or social justice.  Borrowing from cy pres doctrine 
requirements, some contend monetary class action settlements must always 
first attempt a distribution to class members.26  This position bars most 
charitable settlements.  In small stakes cases, individual distribution is often 
costly if not impossible.27  Some critics already have submitted draft 
legislation prohibiting all charitable distributions.28 
Questions about the propriety of charitable settlements impact more than 
just the settlement approval phase of class actions.  Challenges to such 
settlements now bleed into the class certification process, with courts 
entertaining arguments that class actions should not be certified if only a 
charitable settlement is likely.29  For example, in Ramirez v. Dollar Phone 
Corp.,30 Judge Weinstein denied class certification for a group of low-
income, non-English-speaking, immigrant calling card consumers.31  
 
currently exploring potential options regarding such settlements. See ADVISORY COMM. ON 
CIVIL RULES, supra note 22, at 27–38 (discussing various perspectives on cy pres 
distributions). 
 25. See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2012); In re Checking 
Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2011); In re Toys ―R‖ Us 
Antitrust Litig., 191 F.R.D. 347, 353–54 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 26. See, e.g., Boies & Keith, supra note 23, at 281 (―[A] cy pres distribution of residual 
funds to a third party is permissible only when it is not feasible to make distributions to class 
members in the first instance or to make further distributions to class members.‖). 
 27. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 23, at 2079; see also Susan Beth Farmer, More Lessons 
from the Laboratories:  Cy Pres Distributions in Parens Patriae Antitrust Actions Brought by 
State Attorneys General, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 361, 393 (1999) (―Sometimes funds remain 
undistributed because the costs of distribution outweigh the individual share to which 
each . . . group member is entitled.‖); Goutam U. Jois, The Cy Pres Problem and the Role of 
Damages in Tort Law, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL‘Y & L. 258, 264 (2008) (―[T]he costs of 
identifying and notifying the class members may be higher than the amount of their potential 
recovery, such that notifying the members would deplete the entire fund.‖). 
 28. Lawyers for Civil Justice‘s draft legislation aims to limit charitable settlements by 
attacking them on two fronts. See LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, TO RESTORE A RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN CLASSES AND THEIR ACTIONS:  A CALL FOR MEANINGFUL REFORM OF RULE 23 
(2013), available at http://www.reedsmith.com/files/uploads/DrugDeviceLawBlog/ 
LCJ%20Comment_Class%20Action%20Reform_8-9-13.pdf.  The first proposal would flatly 
prohibit any settlement that distributed funds to non-class members. Id. at 8–9.  In the 
alternative, the legislation pushes for extreme reform by denying class attorneys 
compensation for funds given to nonclass members, thus undercutting the likelihood that 
small-stakes cases will be brought in the future. Id. at 23. 
 29. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Dollar Phone Corp., 668 F. Supp. 2d 448 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 30. 668 F. Supp. 2d 448 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 31. Id. at 467. 
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Individually, alleged damages were minimal32—making this a case well-
suited for a charitable distribution in place of direct compensation.  
However, the court held that because consumers suffered only small 
individual damages, a class action was not superior to other avenues of 
redress, such as legislative reform.33  Accordingly, resolving how charitable 
settlements provide class members valuable relief is imperative for 
settlement approval and for class certification inquiries. 
This Article sounds a different note, demonstrating how taking charitable 
settlements off the table would effectively gut the use of class actions for 
private enforcement of laws designed to protect consumers.34  The Article 
proceeds as follows.  Part I details judicial response to cy pres remainders 
and charitable settlements, explaining their shared origin, but more 
importantly, exploring the practical and conceptual differences between the 
two.  It proposes the term ―charitable settlements‖ to highlight these 
important differences.  Part II defends charitable settlements, detailing their 
equitable and theoretical justifications.  In doing so, Part II details, and then 
debunks, criticism of such settlements.  With the theoretical roadblocks 
cleared, Part III identifies discrete and practical alterations to judicial 
evaluation of charitable settlements.  These revisions strike a balance 
between saving charitable settlements and maintaining rigor in the 
settlement approval process under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e). 
I.   CHARITABLE SETTLEMENTS IN CLASS ACTIONS 
Understanding charitable settlements requires some background on the cy 
pres doctrine and class action settlements.  This part discusses:  (1) the rise 
of charitable distributions and (2) judicial evaluation of charitable 
settlements. 
A.   The Rise of Charitable Distribution 
Like many other areas of law, class actions are likely to settle before 
trial.35  All federal class action settlements are evaluated by the same 
standard, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), which requires ―fair, 
reasonable, and adequate‖ settlements.36  While courts encourage 
 
 32. Id. at 450 (noting the named class representative‘s claim would be for approximately 
$2). 
 33. Id. at 468 (―In the present case, the only adequate and appropriate way to protect the 
rights of the Rule 23(b)(3) class is through regulation and enforcement by a federal 
administrative agency.‖). 
 34.  See, e.g., In re Serzone Prods. Liab. Litig., 231 F.R.D. 221, 240 (S.D. W. Va. 2005) 
(―A class action significantly reduces the overall cost of complex litigation, allowing 
plaintiffs‘ attorneys to pool their resources and requiring defendants to litigate all potential 
claims at once, thereby leveling the playing field between the two sides.‖ (citing In re Agent 
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 842 (E.D.N.Y. 1984))); see also William B. 
Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 433 (2001) (―Class 
actions can reduce disparities in bargaining power between plaintiffs and defendants.‖). 
 35. WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13:1 (5th ed. 2014). 
 36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).  This standard equally applies post-certification and to 
classes certified for settlement purposes. 
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settlements,37 the approval process is extensive.38  Courts consider:  (1) the 
litigation‘s complexity and duration; (2) the class‘s reaction to the 
settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings; (4) the risks of establishing 
liability and damages; (5) the risks of maintaining a class action; (6) the 
defendant‘s ability to withstand a greater judgment; (7) the settlement‘s 
reasonableness in light of the best recovery; and (8) its reasonableness in 
light of all the attendant risks of litigation.39 
If the proposed settlement satisfies these criteria, the court grants 
preliminary approval.40  It is then vetted by class members, who are notified 
of the pending settlement.41  Disgruntled class members must elect one of 
two options:  (1) they can opt out of the settlement, which preserves their 
due process rights and allows them to bring a subsequent suit for the alleged 
misconduct; or (2) they can object.42  Once a class member opts out, he 
 
 37. See RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 35, § 13:1 (noting that there is a ―strong judicial 
policy in favor of class action settlement‖) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., In re 
HealthSouth Corp. Secs. Litig., 572 F.3d 854, 862 (11th Cir. 2009) (―Public policy strongly 
favors the pretrial settlement of class action lawsuits.‖ (quoting U.S. Oil & Gas Litig., 967 
F.2d 489 (11th Cir. 1992))); Robinson v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 566 F.3d 642, 648 (6th 
Cir. 2009) (―[P]ublic policy strongly favors settlement of disputes without 
litigation . . . .  Settlement agreements should therefore be upheld whenever equitable and 
policy considerations so permit.‖ (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Mustangs Unlimited, Inc., 487 
F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 2007))); Macedonia Church v. Lancaster Hotel, LP, No. 05-0153 
(TLM), 2011 WL 2360138, at *9 (D. Conn. June 9, 2011) (―Federal courts strongly favor 
and encourage settlements, particularly in class actions and other complex matters, where the 
inherent costs, delays, and risks of continued litigation might otherwise overwhelm any 
potential benefit the class could hope to obtain.‖). 
 38. Class actions pursued under Fair Labor Standards Act section 216(b) are beyond the 
scope of this Article.  Section 216(b) does not apply in this case because it deals specifically 
with claims for minimum wages or overtime pay. See, e.g., Sari M. Alamuddin et al., 
Differences Between Rule 23 Class Actions and FLSA § 216(B) Collective Actions; Tips for 
Achieving Class and Collective Action Certification:  And Certification Post-Dukes, 890 
PRACTISING L. INST. 293 (2012).  Unlike compensatory Rule 23 cases, where class members 
generally are included unless they opt-out of the settlement, section 216(b) claims are 
described as ―opt-in‖ actions because party plaintiffs must give written consent to become a 
party in the action. Id. at 301. 
 39. Some courts reference these factors by different names (e.g., the Reed factors and the 
Girsh factors).  Despite different names, what each list of factors evaluates is common. 
Compare In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 232–33 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Girsh v. 
Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975)) (Girsh factors), with In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig 
―Deepwater Horizon,‖ 295 F.R.D. 112, 146 (E.D. La. 2013), and In re Heartland Payment 
Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1063 (S.D. Tex. 2012). 
 40. See, e.g., Cook v. Howard Indus., Inc., No. 2:11CV199-KS-MTP, 2013 WL 943664, 
at *2 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 11, 2013); Wallace v. Powell, 288 F.R.D. 347, 371 (M.D. Pa. 2012); 
In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 321 F. Supp. 2d 619, 633 (E.D. Pa. 2004). 
 41. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1) (requiring the court to direct notice to ―all class 
members who would be bound by the proposal‖).  The purpose of such notice is to permit 
absent class members an opportunity to review the settlement terms and be heard if they 
want to object or respond to the proposed settlement. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. 
Sales Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 326–27 (3d Cir. 1998); Diaz v. Trust Territory of Pac. 
Islands, 876 F.2d 1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 42. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4)–(5).  Opt-out numbers matter.  First, as part of the settlement 
approval, courts often inquire about the number of opt-outs as an indicator of the fairness of 
the settlement.  Second, some settlements are structured to include ―blow provisions‖—
meaning if there are too many class members who opt-out, the settlement is no longer 
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loses standing to object to the settlement.43  After hearing objections, the 
court decides whether to grant final approval.44 
Once the settlement is approved, eligible class members usually stand to 
receive a monetary distribution.  However, given the representative nature 
of class action suits, many class members cannot be located or are either 
unable or unwilling to satisfy claim requirements.45  Some class members 
never learn of the settlement46 or forego filing claims.47  Even with directly 
mailed settlement checks, some are returned or never cashed.48  Other 
times, the claim‘s process costs exceed individual settlement amounts.  This 
is particularly true with low individual damage cases (often called ―small-
stake claims‖), where the time and effort involved may not incentivize class 
members to submit claims.49 
Hence, distribution of settlement funds is a key issue in any damages 
class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).50  When 
settlement funds cannot be distributed to class members, courts can return 
the money to defendants (―reverters‖); let the money escheat to the state 
(―escheatment‖); or find an equitable way to distribute the money under the 
cy pres doctrine.51  Of these, courts often reject reverters and 
 
binding. See, e.g., Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 1993).  
Hence, opt-outs serve as a stopgap for potentially problematic settlements. 
 43. See Mayfield v. Barr, 985 F.2d 1090, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1993); New Mexico ex rel. 
Energy & Minerals Dep‘t v. U.S. Dep‘t of the Interior, 820 F.2d 441, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1987); 
see also Jenson v. Cont‘l Fin. Corp., 591 F.2d 477, 482 n.7 (8th Cir. 1979); In re Sunrise 
Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 450, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1990); RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 35, § 13:23. 
 44. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.635 (2004). 
 45. See MARCY HOGAN GREER, A PRACTITIONER‘S GUIDE TO CLASS ACTIONS 37 (Supp. 
2012). 
 46. See, e.g., Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1306 
(9th Cir. 1990) (―[A] substantial number of class members would never be located for 
distribution of the damage award.‖). 
 47. See, e.g., SEC v. Bear Sterns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); 
Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 557 F. Supp. 1091, 1104 (N.D. Ill. 1983).  Foregoing claims 
filing is a particular problem for elderly or ill class members.  Rhonda Wasserman, Cy Pres 
in Class Action Settlements, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 97, 104 (2014). 
 48. See, e.g., All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants, 645 F.3d 329, 330 (5th Cir. 2011) (―The 
settlement administrator sent checks to the last known addresses of plaintiffs, but many were 
returned as undeliverable or were never cashed.‖); Powell v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 119 F.3d 703, 
707 (8th Cir. 1997) (―[O]ver 125 checks were returned as undeliverable.‖). 
 49. See, e.g., Nachsin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 2011); Fitzpatrick, 
supra note 23, at 2080 (―[S]ometimes the amounts class members are entitled to under the 
judgment are so small that they do not come forward to claim their awards.‖). 
 50. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (setting forth the requirement for a monetary damages class 
action).  The 1966 Amendment to Rule 23 resulted in larger classes, which correspondingly 
made it more difficult to reach all class members. See Johnston, supra note 23, at 281 
(discussing how the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules resulted in increased use of class 
action procedures).   This amendment resulted in the growth of class actions in the 1970s. Id. 
It was during the rise of class actions that problems with the one plaintiff/one check 
settlement model came to light. Id.  This Article focuses exclusively on 23(b)(3) class 
actions. 
 51. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 35, § 12:28; see also Six (6) Mexican Workers, 904 
F.2d at 1307. 
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escheatment.52  Reverters undermine class actions‘ deterrence goals, while 
escheatment is overly cumbersome and risks only benefiting local 
governments rather than advancing the goals of the underlying claims.53  
Consequently, courts instead approve settlements that provide alternative 
distributions under an expansive interpretation of the cy pres doctrine.54 
Cy pres, meaning ―as near as possible,‖55 is an equitable doctrine that 
allows the court to modify trust funds used for a specific charitable purpose 
when the trust is no longer viable.56  Goree v. Georgia Industrial Home57 
provides a discrete example.  There, the testator bequeathed money to ―the 
Central Howard Association, an Orphan‘s Home located in Macon, 
Georgia.‖58  However, no such association existed.  Consequently, the court 
applied the cy pres doctrine, modifying the trust to allow the money to help 
orphaned children in Macon, Georgia.59 
While the cy pres doctrine originated from trust law over a century ago, it 
since has been used in a variety of contexts—including class actions.60  
Courts have used cy pres as a shorthand for many different class action 
settlement structures during the last thirty years.  Such options once 
included price rollbacks, discounts, and coupons.61  But these distribution 
 
 52. See, e.g., In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig. (No. II), No. 1206 (MDL), 2007 WL 
4377835, at *18 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2007) (rejecting escheatment); Sylvester v. CIGNA 
Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 34, 46 (D. Me. 2005) (rejecting settlement involving reverter); 
accord Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 785 (7th Cir. 2004) (labeling a 
reversion provision a ―questionable feature‖ of a settlement agreement); Sylvester, 369 F. 
Supp. 2d at 52 (―[R]everter clauses are generally ‗suspect‘ and need to be viewed cautiously 
since they ‗undercut the deterrent effect of class actions . . .‘‖); Zawikowski v. Beneficial 
Nat‘l Bank, No. 98 C 2178, 2001 WL 290402, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2001) (―[R]eversion 
provisions need careful scrutiny.‖). But see In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., No. 
12-15705, 2015 WL 846008, at *8 (9th Cir. Feb. 27, 2015) (permitting reverter). 
 53. See Boies & Keith, supra note 23, at 269; 2 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN 
ON CLASS ACTIONS § 8:15 (10th ed. 2013) (―[A]n earmarked distribution to the government 
is cumbersome because it entails government involvement.‖). 
 54. See, e.g., In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392, 1395 
(N.D. Ga. 2001) (―[T]he substantive policies underlying the statutes upon which the 
plaintiffs sued would dictate a preference for an appropriate cy pres distribution rather than a 
reversion of undistributed funds to the defendant, the alleged wrongdoer.‖ (quoting HERBERT 
B. NEWBERG & ALBA C. CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.20 (3d ed. 1992))). 
 55. RONALD CHESTER ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 431 (2000) (quoting 
Brudenell v. Elwes, 102 Eng. Rep. 171, 174 (1801)). 
 56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003). 
 57. 200 S.E. 684 (Ga. 1938). 
 58. Id. at 684–85. 
 59. Id. at 686. 
 60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (―Occasionally, the term ‗cy pres‘ is 
casually used to refer to reformations or judicial modifications in other contexts in which 
some modified effect is given to dispositions that would otherwise exceed what the law 
allows.‖); cf. Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of Conservation 
Easements, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 421, 437 (2005) (applying the cy pres doctrine to 
donated conservation easements). 
 61. See Theodore H. Frank, Cy Pres Settlements, CLASS ACTION WATCH, Mar. 31, 2008, 
at 1; Johnston, supra note 23, at 292. 
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methods fell out of favor because they often advantage defendants by 
generating new sales out of alleged misconduct.62 
Concerns about nonmonetary distributions spurred courts and the 
judiciary to limit such settlements, particularly for coupon deals.  In 2005, 
the Class Action Fairness Act63 (CAFA) created significant obstacles for 
settlement approval.  Because of these restrictions, by 2008 the term cy pres 
generally referenced any settlement where funds went to a charity or a non-
profit because of distribution problems—a settlement structure CAFA was 
notably silent on. 
Rather than recognizing different forms of charitable distributions, courts 
and scholars universally call any class action settlement where money goes 
to charities or non-profits ―cy pres.‖  In some instances, courts use cy pres 
to signify the distribution of leftover settlement funds.64  Other times, cy 
pres means settlements given entirely to charity.65  Still other times, cy pres 
means settlements where the money is split between class members and a 
designated charity.66 
In some ways, this generic phrase makes sense.  All these settlements 
result in third party disbursements, solve distribution problems, and extend 
from courts‘ equitable power.  However, in actuality, courts are approving 
two different types of charitable distributions:  (1) cy pres remainders; and 
(2) charitable settlements.  Though this Article is the first to make this 
distinction, the delineation is justified. 
Cy pres remainders result from settlements where all the funds are 
intended to be distributed to class members.  For example, take a $30 
million settlement that gives each of the five million class members $6.  In 
small-stake settlements, roughly 10 percent of class members submit 
 
 62. See Severin Borenstein, Settling for Coupons:  Discount Contracts As Compensation 
and Punishment in Antitrust Lawsuits, 39 J.L. & ECON. 379, 399 (1996) (explaining how 
coupons may give defendants a competitive advantage); Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-
Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 
49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1039 (2002) (same). 
 63. See 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (2012). See generally Andrew McGuiness & Richard Gottlieb, 
New Class Action Law Contains Pitfalls for Defendants, 28 CHI. LAW. 60 (2005) (discussing 
coupon settlement provisions in CAFA). 
 64. See, e.g., In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 31–32 
(1st Cir. 2009); Simon II Litig. v. Philip Morris USA, 407 F.3d 125, 131 (3d Cir. 2005); In 
re Mex. Money Transfer Litig., 267 F.3d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 2001); Diamond Chem. Co. v. 
Akzo Nobel Chems. B.V., No. 01-2118 (CKK), 2007 WL 2007447, at *1 (D.D.C. July 10, 
2007). 
 65. Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2012) reh‟g en banc denied, 709 
F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2013); see also New York v. Reebok Int‘l Ltd., 903 F. Supp. 532, 534 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (settlement distributed to state recreational activities and facilities); In re 
Toys ―R‖ Us Antitrust Litig., 191 F.R.D. 347, 353–54 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (distributing $57 
million to charity and schools); In re Vitamin Cases, 107 Cal. App. 4th 820, 831–32 (2003) 
(affirming charitable distribution as entire settlement). 
 66. See, e.g., In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 424 F.3d 132, 141 n.10 (2d. Cir. 
2005); In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1354–57 (S.D. Fla. 
2011); Stanley v. U.S. Steel Co., No. 04-74654, 2010 WL 299493, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 20, 
2010). 
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claims.67  Hence, a significant pot of money is leftover—the amount of 
which varies depending on how many class members make a claim, but 
here it would be close to $27 million.  That leftover pot is then distributed 
to a charity or non-profit, a distribution this Article calls a cy pres 
remainder.  The settlement attempted to distribute directly to class 
members, which partly failed, so the court substituted a different recipient 
using its equitable powers.68  Analogically, this is similar to courts‘ power 
in charitable trusts, thus justifying the cy pres label.69 
In contrast, charitable settlements involve the settlement itself, not just a 
remainder, making them analytically distinct from cy pres.  Severing 
charitable settlements from cy pres recognizes notable differences between 
the distribution methods.70  Charitable settlements do not rely on failed 
distributions; rather, the original settlement specifically designates money 
to go to a non-profit or charity.71  Consequently, charitable settlements are 
purely a solution to distribution problems and, at most, an extension of the 
equitable principles underlying the trust doctrine of cy pres—rather than an 
extension of the doctrine itself. 
 
 67. See, e.g., Walter v. Hughes Commc‘ns, Inc., No. 09-2136 SC, 2011 WL 2650711, at 
*13 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2011) (―[A]verage claims submission rates in similar class actions are 
typically ten percent or less.‖); Declaration of Shannon R. Wheatman, Kendrick v. Standard 
Fire Insur. Co., Nos. 2:06-CV-00141(DLB), 2:08-CV-00129(DLB), 2010 WL 4168582, at 
*1 (E.D. Ky. June 28, 2010) (―Typical claims rate are well under 5% so, in my opinion, a 
claims rate over 10% is very high.‖).  These low claim rates are likely attributable to the 
reality that ―individuals are not risk averse with respect to small losses.‖ Fitzpatrick, supra 
note 23, at 2067. 
 68. See, e.g., Superior Beverage Co., Inc. v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 477, 479 
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (describing charitable distributions as part of the judiciary‘s ―broad equitable 
powers‖); In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392, 1394 (N.D. Ga. 
2001) (noting courts‘ broad equitable powers allow for charitable distributions). 
 69. See, e.g., Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 557 F. Supp. 1091, 1109 (N.D. Ill. 1983) 
(―We note that, because this fund already exists, the analogy between this case and the trust 
law origins of the cy pres doctrine is a particularly close one.‖). 
 70. For example, unlike in cy pres settlement, in the charitable settlement context, there 
is no settlor, meaning there is no one who originally created the fund, with an intent to create 
a gift at the time of funding. See, e.g., Quinn v. Peoples Trust & Sav. Co., 60 N.E.2d 281, 
286–87 (Ind. 1945); State ex rel. Att‘y Gen. v. Van Buren Sch. Dist., 89 S.W.2d 605, 608 
(Ark. 1936).  With cy pres settlements, class members had at least an indirect possessory 
interest in the potential monetary distribution under the terms of the settlement. Cf. Boeing 
Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 480 (1980) (―Their right to share the harvest of the lawsuit 
upon proof of their identity, whether or not they exercise it, is a benefit in the fund created 
by the efforts of the class representatives and their counsel.‖).  Thus, they can arguably 
satisfy the settlor requirement.  This is not the case with charitable settlements, where the 
settlement terms do not provide class members with any possessory interest.  While the 
defendant‘s coffers fund the settlement, the defendant does not satisfy this requirement.  The 
settlement represents money allegedly wrongfully obtained from the class, not a charitable 
donation.  Defendants‘ funding of the settlement is not wholly voluntary but rather intended 
to end litigation—thus meaning they lacked the intent to create a true gift.  Thus, there is no 
settlor in the charitable settlement context—further justifying a distinction between the two 
settlement forms. 
 71. See, e.g., New York v. Reebok Int‘l Ltd., 903 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(settlement distributed to state recreational activities and facilities); In re Toys ―R‖ Us 
Antitrust Litig., 191 F.R.D. 347, 349 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (settlement distributed about or 
approximately $37 million in new toys through the Toys for Tots program and established a 
$20 million fund to buy books and computers for schools). 
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Charitable settlements are either earmarked or wholly charitable.72  
Earmarked charitable settlements designate funds for direct distribution to 
class members and funds to be distributed to a non-profit or charity.  For 
example, the settlement in In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation73 
included an earmarked settlement—the agreement split the $410 million 
settlement between class members and charity.74  In contrast, wholly 
charitable settlements, like the Facebook settlement Justice Roberts 
questioned, give the entire settlement fund to a non-profit or charity:  no 
settlement portion is directly distributed to class members.75 
Instead of recognizing these nuances, judicial evaluation of charitable 
distributions is in a state of chaos.  A discussion of judicial review of 
charitable settlements—and the accompanying confusion—is the focus of 
the next section. 
B.   Judicial Evaluation of Charitable Settlements 
Rule 23(e) requires no special tests for assessing the fairness of charitable 
distributions.  However, because such settlements can involve significant 
sums of money—often millions of dollars76—judges have generated 
supplementary common law requirements.  These requirements include:  a 
qualifying trigger; sufficient nexus; and lack of collusion.77  From there, 
courts also consider how to calculate attorney fees in cases involving 
charitable distributions.78  In applying these requirements and quantifying 
fees, judicial interpretation differs, resulting in confusion and inconsistent 
outcomes. 
First, before permitting an alternative distribution, courts require some 
problem exist with directly distributing funds to class members, i.e., a 
 
 72. Compare Assets Litig., 424 F.3d 132 (2d. Cir. 2005) (earmarked charitable 
settlement), and Stanley v. U.S. Steel Co., No. 04-74654, 2010 WL 299493 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 
20, 2010) (same), with In re Netflix Privacy Litig., No. 5:11-CV-00379 EJD, 2013 WL 
1120801, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2013) (wholly charitable settlement), and In re Vitamin 
Cases, 107 Cal. App. 4th 820, 824 (2003) (same). 
 73. 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
 74. Id. at 1354–57.  The earmarked portion reflected the portion of the class who could 
not be located because of a problem with defendant‘s recordkeeping. See id.  In addition to 
an earmarked charitable distribution, the settlement agreement also included a cy pres 
remainder for any direct distributions that failed. Id.  Hence, the percentage of the overall 
settlement going to charity would not be known until the end of the settlement distribution 
process. Id. 
 75. Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2012), reh‟g en banc denied, 
709 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2013); see also In re Vitamin, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 831–32 (affirming 
cy pres award of an entire settlement). 
 76. See, e.g., In re Netflix Privacy, 2013 WL 1120801, at *1 (approving $9 million 
wholly charitable settlement); In re Vitamin, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 824 (approving charitable 
distribution of $38 million to promote the health and nutrition of class members). 
 77. See, e.g., Lane, 696 F.3d at 821; Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1038–41 
(9th Cir. 2011). 
 78. See, e.g., In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 178 (3d Cir. 2013); 
Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 423, 435 (2d Cir. 2007); Six (6) 
Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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―trigger‖ requirement.79  This trigger varies:  some courts mandate a direct 
distribution be impossible or impracticable80 while others allow mere 
inefficiency to justify charitable distributions.81 
Generally, cy pres remainders—where leftover funds exist after 
distribution to class members—satisfy this trigger,82 but the trigger for 
charitable distributions is unsettled.  For net-zero cases, where the 
distribution‘s administrative costs exceed class members‘ individual 
monetary distributions, most courts approve charitable settlements.83 
Courts are uncertain how to apply the trigger to low-sum cases, however, 
where costs do not fully exhaust the settlement fund.  Some courts define 
the trigger requirement to require an attempted class member distribution 
before any distribution to a third party can occur.84  For example, in In re 
Lupron Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation,85 the First Circuit held 
distributions to third parties can occur only after meeting ―the American 
Law Institute‘s benchmark of ‗100 percent recovery‘ for all class 
members.‖86  Other courts have a more generous trigger requirement.  For 
instance, the Second Circuit upheld a settlement in New York v. Reebok 
International Ltd.87 without demanding any individual distribution prior to 
creating a charitable settlement.  Rather, it approved a wholly charitable 
settlement because it would be ―impracticab[le] [to] attempt[] to distribute 
the settlement proceeds among the multitude of unidentified possible 
 
 79. See, e.g., infra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
 80. See, e.g., In re Matzo Food Prods. Litig., 156 F.R.D. 600, 605 (D.N.J. 1994) 
(allowing charitable distribution when ―distribution [is] economically impossible‖); In re 
Dep‘t of Energy Stripper Well Exemption Litig., 578 F. Supp. 586, 591 (D. Kan. 1983). 
 81. See, e.g., Lane, 696 F.3d at 825 (―[T]here is no dispute that it would be 
‗burdensome‘ and inefficient to pay the $6.5 million in cy pres funds that remain . . .‖); In re 
Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 282 F.R.D. 92, 117 (D.N.J. 2012) (―Given the large number 
of class members, distribution of the Settlement Fund to each member would be inefficient 
and ineffective.‖). 
 82. See, e.g., In re Airline Ticket Comm‘n Antitrust Litig., 307 F.3d 679, 684 (8th Cir. 
2002); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 744 F.2d 1252, 1254 (7th Cir. 1984); Glen Ellyn 
Pharmacy, Inc. v. La Roche-Posay, LLC, No. 11 C 968, 2012 WL 619595, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 
Feb. 23, 2012). 
 83. See, e.g., Jones v. Nat‘l Distillers, 56 F. Supp. 2d 355, 357–58 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); 
New York ex rel. Koppell v. Keds Corp., No. 93 CIV. 6708(CSH), 1994 WL 97201, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1994); In re Matzo, 156 F.R.D. at 605–06. 
 84. Courts adopting this narrow definition often reference the ALI‘s Principles of the 
Law of Aggregate Litigation, which states that ―the settlement should presumptively provide 
for further distributions to participating class members unless the amounts involved are too 
small to make individual distributions economically viable or other specific reasons exist 
that would make such further distributions impossible or unfair.‖ PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07(b) (2010).  Following the ALI Principles‘ lead, the recent 
Rule 23 Subcommittee Report uses similar language but alters it slightly to consider whether 
―the distributions are sufficiently large to make individual distribution economically viable.‖ 
ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 22, at 265. 
 85. 677 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 86. Id. at 30. 
 87. 96 F.3d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding the charitable settlement allotted by the 
Southern District of New York); New York. v. Reebok Int‘l Ltd., 903 F. Supp. 532, 534–35 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (showing how California would distribute these funds to schools, parks, 
recreation departments, and community youth groups). 
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claimants‖ without depleting the settlement funds.88  Thus, the trigger for 
approving a charitable settlement depends on the court. 
Second, the common law nexus requirement evaluates the proposed 
third-party recipients.89  Most courts evaluate whether the recipient‘s 
interests ―reasonably approximate those being pursued by the class.‖90  The 
closer the nexus, the more gain for class members.91  For example, Cohen v. 
Chilcott92 involved a $1.5 million charitable settlement from an antitrust 
class claim against hormonal contraceptive manufacturers who allegedly 
conspired to deny access to cheaper generics.93  The settlement required the 
distribution be given to doctors, university health centers, and charities that 
provide reproductive health services.94  In approving the settlement over 
objections that class members should instead receive money, the court 
highlighted how the distributions increased access to needed drugs—a 
societal benefit intended by the underlying antitrust claim.95 
How the nexus requirement applies varies by court.  At least one court 
has rejected the requirement altogether.96  Some courts require a close 
nexus between the asserted claim and the charitable distribution, in terms of 
purpose and geographic scope of the charitable distribution.97  Others focus 
the nexus requirement on the underlying statute‘s purpose—not the specific 
claim asserted—and the charitable distribution.98  In these courts, it is 
enough for a charitable distribution to advance judicial access or consumer 
 
 88. Reebok, 96 F.3d at 49. 
 89. Charitable distributions have been used in a variety of ways. See, e.g., In re 
EasySaver Rewards Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1045–46 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (―The Cash 
Fund is non-reversionary . . . to fund higher education projects relating to internet privacy 
and consumer protection . . . .‖); In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 
1330, 1355 (S.D. Fl. 2011) (promoting ―financial literacy‖); In re Compact Disc Minimum 
Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D. 197, 199 (D. Me. 2003) (music distributions to 
libraries and educational institutions); Diamond Chem. Co., Inc. v. Akzo Nobel Chems. 
B.V., No. 01 2118 CKK, 2007 WL 2007447, at *3 (D.D.C. July 10, 2007) (research on 
globalization and private antitrust enforcement); C. BRUCE LAWRENCE & BARBARA 
FINKELSTEIN, SPECIAL COMM. ON FUNDING FOR CIVIL LEGAL SERVS., CY PRES FOR CIVIL 
LEGAL SERVICES:  A REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATE FROM THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON 
FUNDING FOR CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES 3 (2006), available at https://www.nysba.org/ 
WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=26860 (legal representation for indigent populations). 
 90. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07(c) (2010). 
 91. See EasySaver, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 1052; In re Eunice Train Derailment, No. 00-
1267, 2012 WL 70651 (W.D. La. Jan. 9, 2012). 
 92. 522 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 93. Id. at 111. 
 94. Id. at 112. 
 95. Id. at 119; accord Albert A. Foer, Enhancing Competition Through the Cy Pres 
Remedy:  Suggested Best Practices, 24 ANTITRUST 86 (2010) (―[B]ecause the funds will be 
used to promote competition or dissuade the kinds of actions that constituted an antitrust 
violation, or will benefit society in general, class members who did not assert a claim are 
indirectly benefited.‖). 
 96. See Shapira v. City of Minneapolis, No. 06-cv-2190, 2012 WL 1438813, at *2 (D. 
Minn. Apr. 26, 2012). 
 97. See, e.g., In re Airline Ticket Comm‘n Antitrust Litig., 268 F.3d 619, 626 (8th Cir. 
2001). 
 98. See, e.g., Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2011) (requiring a 
―driving nexus‖); In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 33 (1st Cir. 
2002). 
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protection research; the distribution‘s use need not perfectly align with the 
specific facts of the case. 
A recent Third Circuit opinion has added another wrinkle to the nexus 
requirement.  In In re Baby Products,99 the court interpreted Rule 23 to 
require a ―direct benefit‖ to class members.100  The court did not fully 
explain the rationale behind this requirement beyond saying that ―in our 
view . . . [charitable settlements] are inferior to direct distributions to the 
class because they only imperfectly serve the purpose of the underlying 
causes of action—to compensate class members.‖101  Nor did the court 
clarify how direct a benefit must be, though it explicitly left open the 
possibility of charitable distributions in lieu of monetary compensation.102 
The third test (a lack of collusion) also has led to judicial confusion.  For 
this test, courts determine if the charitable settlement demonstrates the 
parties acted in their own self-interest.103  Some courts have identified three 
supposed indicia of collusion.  These ―red flags‖ are:  (1) a high percentage 
of the settlement going to charity;104 (2) clear sailing provisions—whereby 
defendants agree not to contest fee awards up to a certain monetary 
value;105 and (3) reverters, meaning settlements where unclaimed funds 
return to the defendant.106  While these red flags may have value for 
evaluating a cy pres remainder, they add little value for a charitable 
settlement.  After all, any charitable settlement would raise the first of these 
red flags because the bulk of the settlement goes to charity. 
Finally, even if a charitable settlement survives this three-prong analysis, 
courts differ on how to compute attorneys‘ fees.  As part of the settlement 
approval process, class counsel submits fee applications to reimburse for 
the time and expenses spent litigating the class claim.107  The Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure give district court judges the discretion to grant class 
 
 99. 708 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 100. Id. at 181. 
 101. Id. at 169. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id. at 175; In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 946–47 
(9th Cir. 2011) (vacating approval of settlement in case with ―warning signs‖ of collusion); 
Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 785 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating because class 
actions are ―rife with potential conflicts,‖ district courts must scrutinize a proposed 
settlement to ensure that class counsel are acting ―as honest fiduciaries for the class as a 
whole‖). 
 104. See Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 952 (7th Cir. 2006); Crawford v. 
Equifax Payment Servs., Inc., 201 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 105. Lobatz v. U.S. W. Cellular of Cal., Inc., 222 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(contending clear sailing provisions carry ―the potential of enabling a defendant to pay class 
counsel excessive fees and costs in exchange for counsel accepting an unfair settlement on 
behalf of the class‖); see also Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 524 (1st 
Cir. 1991) (―[L]awyers might urge a class settlement at a low figure or on a less-than-
optimal basis in exchange for red-carpet treatment on fees.‖). 
 106. In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 947; Mirfasihi, 356 F.3d at 785. 
 107. See Strong v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 137 F.3d 844, 850 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(discussing how part of a court‘s duty in reviewing the fairness of a proposed settlement is to 
review a fee request). 
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counsel a ―reasonable fee award for their efforts.‖108  A fee petition‘s 
reasonableness is frequently determined by using the percentage of the 
settlement fund method,109 which ―resembles a contingent fee in that it 
awards counsel a variable percentage of the amount recovered for the 
class.‖110  In calculating settlement values, some courts treat charitable 
distributions the same as money paid directly to class members, on a dollar-
for-dollar basis.111  But others have discounted charitable distributions in 
computing attorneys‘ fees.112 
Between Rule 23(e) and the common law trigger, nexus, and collusion 
tests, the settlement review process appears highly structured.  In reality, 
however, there is still a great deal of judicial discretion, which has led to 
inconsistent decisions over similar charitable settlements and created 
openings for objectors to challenge any charitable distribution. 
Objections are a double-edged sword.  On one side, objectors can provide 
a check to ensure in-depth judicial evaluation of a proposed settlement.113  
On the other side, objections can result in wasted judicial and attorney 
resources.  As Professor Greenberg cogently explains: 
[I]n reality, all too frequently, objectors and their counsel see an 
opportunity to extract money from the parties or class counsel, whose 
efforts brought about the settlement, by threatening to upset or seriously 
detour the settlement.  Objectors make arguments that are groundless yet 
 
 108. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) (―In a certified class action, the court may award reasonable 
attorney‘s fees . . . .‖). 
 109. In calculating fees, courts adopt one of three approaches:  a percentage of the 
settlement fund; lodestar; or percentage of the fund with a lodestar cross-check.  The lodestar 
method awards fees based on the number of hours worked on the case multiplied by a 
reasonable hourly rate.  This figure then can be adjusted based on the risk of nonrecovery.  
See Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. of Phila. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 
F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973) (creating the lodestar approach).  Some courts use the cross-
check method, which compares the first and second approaches. See, e.g., In re Prudential 
Ins. Co. Sales Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 333–34 (3d Cir. 1998).  A great deal of 
scholarship exists that discusses the strengths and weaknesses of these methods. See, e.g., 
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation:  Balancing Fairness and 
Efficiency in the Large Class Actions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 887 (1987) (arguing in support 
of the percentage of the fund method because it ―can align [clients‘] interests with their 
own‖); Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth:  
The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 139–47 (2006) 
(arguing that lodestar cross-checks undermine optimal deterrence). 
 110. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 
819 n.38 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 111. See, e.g., Harris v. Vector Mktg. Corp., No. C-08-5198 EMC, 2012 WL 381202, at 
*5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2012); McKinnie v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 678 F. Supp. 2d 
806, 816 (E.D. Wis. 2009); Parker v. Time Warner Entm‘t Co., 631 F. Supp. 2d 242, 269 
(E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 112. See In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 851 F. 
Supp. 2d 1040, 1077 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (―Discounting the amount of the cy pres payment in 
determining its value to the class is consistent with the nature of the indirect benefit cy pres 
provides to the class.‖); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.13 cmt. a 
(2010) (―[B]ecause cy pres payments . . . only indirectly benefit the class, the court need not 
give such payments the same full value for purposes of setting attorneys‘ fees as would be 
given to direct recoveries by the class.‖). 
 113. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 44, § 21.643. 
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sufficient to delay the settlement approval process for months or years 
unless class counsel or the parties agree to ―buy off‖ the objector or the 
objector‘s counsel.  Objector tactics can prove lucrative because the other 
parties may prefer to ―buy off‖ the objectors rather than suffer the delay 
and additional expense necessary to defeat the objection.114 
At this point, objections are almost pro forma with charitable 
settlements.115  Objectors have seized on the supplemental requirements for 
charitable distributions developed by the courts.  They challenge whether a 
distribution is impracticable, the nexus is sufficiently tailored, or the 
proposed recipient satisfies the nexus requirement.116  They also challenge 
compensation for class counsel.117  However, the most divisive issue with 
charitable settlements is whether the parties must first attempt a monetary 
distribution to class members.118  Using the Third Circuit‘s ―direct benefit‖ 
requirement, objectors and class action critics have attacked the entire 
concept of charitable settlements.119 
The remainder of this Article deals with these challenges, making the 
case for charitable settlements and clarifying how to evaluate them under 
Rule 23(e).  Part II responds to the objectors‘ argument that one must first 
attempt a monetary distribution to the class before a charitable settlement 
can be approved.  Part III responds to the objectors‘ points regarding the 
common law requirements and calculating attorneys‘ fees. 
II.   THE CASE FOR CHARITABLE SETTLEMENTS 
The defining feature of charitable settlements is also its most contentious:  
under such settlements class members forego direct compensation.  While a 
cy pres remainder first attempts to distribute settlement funds to class 
members, charitable settlements do not.  The charitable distribution is in 
 
 114. Bruce D. Greenberg, Keeping the Flies Out of the Ointment:  Restricting Objectors 
to Class Action Settlements, 84 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 949, 950 (2010). 
 115. See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2012); In re Netflix 
Privacy Litig., No. 5:11-CV-00379 EJD, 2013 WL 1120801, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 
2013); In re EasySaver Rewards Litig., 737 F. Supp. 2d 1159 (S.D. Cal. 2010). 
 116. See, e.g., Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (challenging 
whether the proposed distribution and recipients were sufficiently tailored); Lane, 696 F.3d 
at 820 (challenging, inter alia, whether distribution was impracticable); In re Lupron Mktg. 
& Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 37 (1st Cir. 2012) (challenging proposed recipient). 
 117. See supra note 109 and accompanying text; accord In re Checking Account 
Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1361 n.30 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (―[M]ost if not all of the 
Objections are motivated by things other than a concern for the welfare of the Settlement 
Class.  Instead, they have been brought by professional objectors and others whose sole 
purpose is to obtain a fee by objecting to whatever aspects of the Settlement they can latch 
onto.‖). 
 118. Compare In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., No. 00 CV 0648, 2001 WL 170792, 
at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2001) (rejecting settlement as unfair for not providing initial direct 
compensation), with In re Vitamin Cases, 107 Cal. App. 4th 820, 832 (2003) (stating there is 
no requirement ―that a settlement allow for individual claims before its fund can be 
distributed to cy pres relief‖). 
 119. See, e.g., Poertner v. Gillette Co., No. 6:12-cv-803-Orl-31 (DAB), 2014 WL 
4162771 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2014) (challenging proposed settlement, in part, because of the 
settlement does not directly benefit class members monetarily); Dryer v. Nat‘l Football 
League, No. 09-2182 (PAM/AJB), 2013 WL 5888231, at *7 (D. Minn. Nov. 1, 2013). 
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lieu of a payday for class members.  Some courts and scholars take issue 
with this result, arguing charitable settlements are per se invalid because 
they do not directly compensate class members.120  This part explains why 
this argument is wrong. 
As a starting point, such arguments confuse cy pres remainders and 
charitable settlements.  While both resolve distribution problems, as 
discussed in Part I, they are distinct settlement structures.  Under the cy pres 
doctrine, courts can substitute payouts to class members with ―the next 
best‖ recipient, i.e., a charitable organization, but only if the initial 
distribution to the class fails or becomes impracticable.121  In contrast, with 
charitable settlements, there is no requirement for a preliminary attempt to 
distribute to class members.  That requirement only comes from the cy pres 
doctrine, not from any explicit requirement under Rule 23(e).  Requiring all 
charitable distributions have an initial unsuccessful attempt to distribute 
money to class members reflects an unfortunate blurring of two very 
different settlement structures. 
More fundamentally, though, arguing that charitable settlements must fail 
because they do not distribute money to class members has larger 
implications for class action jurisprudence.  It subtly redefines the goals of 
class actions, making compensation the only purpose of Rule 23(b)(3).  The 
better view is that compensation is just a by-product of a class action‘s 
regulatory function.122  A class action is a procedural mechanism that 
allows individuals to ―supplement regulatory agencies both by requiring 
wrongdoers to give up their ill-gotten gains and by ferreting out misconduct 
 
 120. Some argue cy pres still may be an option for a remainder, but others take issue with 
any charitable distribution—including cy pres.  For more ardent critics, only monetary 
distributions benefit class members. Compare Boies & Keith, supra note 23, at 281 (arguing 
in favor of cy pres settlements but against charitable settlements), with Redish et al., Cy Pres 
Relief, supra note 17, at 621–24 (arguing against all charitable distributions).  Often, 
portions of the American Law Institute Principles are cited to support this conclusion. See, 
e.g., In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 173 (3d Cir. 2013).  However, when 
read in its entirety, the ALI Principles do not create a presumptive barrier but rather 
recognize such distributions still may be appropriate for small-stakes cases:  if the settlement 
involves individual distributions to class members and funds remain after distributions 
(because some class members could not be identified or chose not to participate), the 
settlement should presumptively provide for further distributions to participating class 
members unless the amounts involved are too small to make individual distributions 
economically viable or other specific reasons exist that would make such further 
distributions impossible or unfair. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07 
cmt. b (2010). 
 121. See, e.g., Dennis, 697 F.3d at 865 (―[T]o ensure that the settlement retains some 
connection to the plaintiff class and the underlying claims, however, a cy pres award must 
qualify as ‗the next best distribution‘ to giving the funds directly to class members.‖); Six (6) 
Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir. 1990) (―Even 
where cy pres is considered, it will be rejected when the proposed distribution fails to 
provide the ‗next best‘ distribution.‖). 
 122. See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, Consumer Class Actions:  Who Are the Real 
Winners?, 56 ME. L. REV. 223, 228 (2004) (―[I]t must be kept in mind that the objective of 
consumer class actions is not only compensation, but also deterrence and disgorgement of 
wrongful profits.‖). 
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that may have escaped the regulators‘ observance.‖123  As a result, class 
actions serve a larger collective good:  they allow individuals to vindicate 
their legal rights and deter wrongdoing, minimizing future harm.124  
Therefore, there are broader regulatory goals, beyond mere compensation, 
behind the federal system for aggregate litigation. 
Assessing class actions with an eye toward their regulatory potential 
makes particular sense for small-stakes cases.  Where individual recovery is 
minimal, non-compensatory goals rise to the foreground.  The focus should 
not be on whether a class member is compensated for his $2 injury.125  
Rather, as Justice Berger described: 
The aggregation of individual claims in the context of a classwide suit is 
an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the 
regulatory action of government.  Where it is not economically feasible to 
obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small 
individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any 
effective redress unless they may employ the class-action device.126 
Thus, the proper question is whether the relief charitable settlements 
offer fulfills the regulatory function of class actions.  This part explains how 
the charitable settlements promote individuals‘ opportunity to vindicate 
rights and deter future wrongdoing.127 
A.   Charitable Settlements Vindicate Substantive Rights 
Charitable settlements serve a valuable purpose, consistent with class 
action goals, because they preserve putative class members‘ ability to assert 
 
 123. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS 
ACTION 232 (1987).  The purpose of class actions have long since been debated, with some 
arguing that class actions are more about autonomy and efficiency than about regulatory 
goals. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions:  Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, 
and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 49 (1975); see also Edward Brunet, Improving 
Class Action Efficiency by Expanded Use of Parens Patriae Suits and Intervention, 74 TUL. 
L. REV. 1919, 1939 (2000) (describing competing law and economic class action arguments).  
However, a more practical approach recognizes both justifications as synergistic rather than 
in tension.  In some cases, class actions are more efficient than multiple potential cases.  In 
other situations, multiple cases are unlikely—particularly when potential damages hardly 
cover the costs of bringing suit.  In those cases, regulatory goals justify a class actions‘ 
utility. See, e.g., Leszczynski v. Allianz Ins., 176 F.R.D. 659, 676 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (―Class 
actions are particularly appropriate, where, as here, multiple lawsuits would not be justified 
because of the small amount of money sought by the individual plaintiffs.‖).  Thus, because 
charitable settlements primarily arise in small-stakes cases, focusing on class actions‘ 
regulatory function is appropriate. 
 124. See Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights:  Myth, Reality, 
and the “Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 666 (1979) (discussing ―the societal 
benefits derived from deterring socially proscribed conduct and providing small claim 
rectification‖ through class actions). 
 125. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 23, at 2067 (―[I]ndividuals are indifferent between, say a 
loss of $1 and a 1% chance of losing $100.‖). 
 126. Deposit Guar. Nat‘l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). 
 127. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 124, at 666 (―Even if the negative effects of class 
actions were assumed, they would have to be balanced against the societal benefits derived 
from deterring socially proscribed conduct and providing small claim rectification—
considerations that thus far have escaped measurement and perhaps always will.‖). 
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substantive legal rights.128  Access to justice—meaning a realistic avenue to 
air grievances—is an essential component of effective regulation via class 
actions.129  As the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure noted, class action mechanisms ―provide means of vindicating 
the rights of groups of people who individually would be without effective 
strength to bring their opponents into court at all.‖130  The substantive laws 
primarily pursued as class actions lack a minimum damages requirement, 
demonstrating Congress already has decided that even in cases where an 
individual has little money at stake, he has the right to make a claim.131  
Charitable settlements protect a class member‘s ability to effectuate these 
statutory rights, thus providing the specific relief intended by class action 
mechanisms—the ability to assert claims.132  Essentially, charitable 
settlements promote access to justice by:  (1) allowing aggrieved 
individuals to stand against alleged wrongdoing; (2) advancing democratic 
participation; and (3) ensuring financial hurdles do not limit opportunities 
to air grievances. 
 
 128. Cf. HON. WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER ET AL., FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE 
TRIAL, NATIONAL EDITION Ch. 10-C (2008) (―[C]lass actions exist to enable persons of 
modest means to vindicate the rights of many.‖). 
 129. Accord Jay Tidmarsh, Living in CAFA‟s World, 32 REV. LITIG. 691, 708 (2013) (―By 
‗justice‘ I do not mean a fair determination of contested legal rights by a court.  Rather, I use 
justice to refer to any process that commences with aggrieved persons laying their 
complaints of legal wrongdoing before a neutral party.‖); Francisco Valdes, Procedure, 
Policy and Power:  Class Actions and Social Justice in Historical and Comparative 
Perspective, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 627, 649 (2008) (―[T]he virtue of the class action was and 
is in the effort to provide access to justice—to deliver justice to those who don‘t have access 
to justice.‖); cf. Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 
497 (1969) (explaining the purpose of the 1966 Amendment of Rule 23 was to expand 
access to justice ―even at the expense of increasing litigation‖). 
 130. See Kaplan, supra note 129, at 497. 
 131. Cf. Max Helveston, Promoting Justice Through Public Interest Advocacy in Class 
Actions, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 749, 772–73 (2012) (discussing how restricting access to class 
actions ―means that a number of the rights and protections that lawmakers have afforded 
individuals are essentially unenforceable‖); Valdes, supra note 129, at 654–55 (―The class 
action device does not itself seek to establish or promulgate those substantive policy choices 
[reflected in substantive law]; the class action instead provides the vehicle to give them some 
real-world bite.  The class action, like other procedures, is a vehicle for the enforcement and 
vindication of substantive rights and obligations embodied in positive policy choices that 
pre-exist the class action.‖). 
 132. See Deposit Guar. Nat‘l. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980) (explaining that 
―[t]he use of the class-action procedure for litigation of individual claims may offer 
substantial advantages for named plaintiffs; it may motivate them to bring cases that for 
economic reasons might not be brought otherwise‖); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (noting that class action suits allow plaintiffs to pursue 
causes of action that otherwise would not be economical); James M. Finberg, Class Actions:  
Useful Devices That Promote Judicial Economy and Provide Access to Justice, 41 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 353, 353–54 (1997) (―Even more importantly, [class actions] provide access to 
justice.  Our justice system is not a system only for the rich and powerful.  It is also a system 
for everyday Americans who need legal redress when they have been wronged.  Class 
actions give them that opportunity by allowing them to aggregate their claims and to fight 
rich and powerful corporations.  By aggregating their claims, they can hire the experts and 
lawyers who can do the analysis that is necessary.‖). 
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First, the ability to assert a right has value independent of whether class 
members receive direct compensation.133  Permitting charitable settlements 
allows class members to ―level the playing field‖ and hold large 
corporations responsible for wrongdoing that results in small individual 
damages but large aggregate harm.134  Taking a public stand matters to 
class members135 and is often an overlooked benefit of charitable 
distributions.136  Eligible class members can be difficult to locate, 
sometimes as a result of defendants‘ faulty recordkeeping.137  Even then, 
administrative costs for individual distribution can exhaust the entirety of 
the settlement fund.138  Charitable settlements overcome these issues, 
ensuring substantive rights are not curtailed due to distribution 
challenges.139 
Second, charitable settlements advance democratic participation and 
protect the perceived fairness of the legal system, as potential claims are not 
precluded because of distribution problems.140  Enhancing fairness by 
 
 133. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 275 (2004) 
(―[T]he value of participation cannot be reduced to a function of the effect of participation 
on outcomes . . . .‖). 
 134. See, e.g., Helveston, supra note 131, at 772–73 (discussing how restricting access to 
class actions ―means that a number of the rights and protections that lawmakers have 
afforded individuals are essentially unenforceable‖); Katie Melnick, In Defense of the Class 
Action Lawsuit:  An Examination of the Implicit Advantages and a Response to Common 
Criticisms, 22 ST. JOHN‘S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 755, 756 (2008). 
 135. See Stephen Meili, Collective Justice or Personal Gain?  An Empirical Analysis of 
Consumer Class Action Lawyers and Named Plaintiffs, 44 AKRON L. REV. 67, 90–91 (2011) 
(discussing ―the desire to make a public statement about defendant‘s conduct‖ as a collective 
justice motivation for named class members). 
 136. See id. 
 137. See, e.g., In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1354 (S.D. 
Fl. 2011); cf. Powell v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 119 F.3d 703, 706 (8th Cir. 1997) (permitting cy pres 
because class members were no longer readily locatable because a decade passed from the 
initial distribution). 
 138. This includes most securities, antitrust, and consumer actions. See Ilana T. Buschkin, 
The Viability of Class Action Lawsuits in a Globalized Economy—Permitting Foreign 
Claimants to be Members of Class Action Lawsuits in the U.S. Federal Courts, 90 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1563, 1564 n.3 (2005). 
 139. Cf. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 414–15 (2002) (right of access to courts 
―is ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by 
being shut out of court‖); Cunningham v. Dist. Att‘ys Office for Escambia Cnty., 592 F.3d 
1237, 1271 (11th Cir. 2010) (―[T]he plaintiff must have an underlying cause of action the 
vindication of which is prevented by the denial of access to the courts.‖ (citing Christopher, 
536 U.S. at 415)); Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1309 (2003) (exploring the right to a remedy through access to the courts). 
 140. Avenues for participation strengthen cooperation with the legal system, which in 
turn encourages compliance with the legal system. Cf. Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne Brett, 
Disputants‟ Perceptions of Dispute Resolution Procedures:  An Ex Ante and Ex Post 
Longitudinal Empirical Study, 41 CONN. L. REV. 63, 72 (2008) (discussing how parties are 
more willing to follow procedural requirements when perceived as fair); see also Floyd 
Feeney, Evaluating Trial Court Performance, 12 JUST. SYS. J. 148, 159 (1987) (describing 
research suggesting that ―decisions perceived as unfair are economically inefficient because 
of the increased resistance‖ to them).  When procedures are considered fair, people are more 
likely to ―obey the law‖ and have greater respect for the legal system. See TOM R. TYLER, 
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 368 (1990); Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Disputant 
Concerns in Mediation, 3 NEGOTIATION J. 367, 368 (1987). 
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guaranteeing judicial access is a gain separate from (and potentially more 
important than) monetary compensation—particularly to class members.141  
Claimants privilege fairness of the adjudicative process over monetary 
results.142  Ensuring judicial access promotes individual dignity, which is an 
essential value in democratic societies.143  ―Dignity is most clearly offended 
when a person believes that she is the victim of governmental arbitrariness 
or private abuse and is barred at the courthouse door or forced to participate 
without assistance or resources.‖144  However, these gains are undermined 
when a swath of otherwise cognizable claims cannot be adjudicated because 
of distribution problems.145 
Third, charitable settlements overcome financial obstacles that might 
otherwise limit access to justice.  Often, aggrieved individuals are limited to 
private litigation to redress alleged wrongdoing, as government agencies 
rarely pursue small-stakes claims.146  Charitable distributions mostly occur 
in cases where financial barriers make individual litigation irrational.147  
Theoretically, an individual has the legal right to assert a claim but ―is 
[often] shut out of the courthouse by economic realities.‖148  Few class 
 
 141. When court procedures do not prioritize constituents‘ larger needs—not just provide 
monetary compensation—this triggers increased risks of discontent and mistrust of the legal 
system. See, e.g., Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 140, at 72. 
 142. See id. at 68–69. 
 143. Ensuring judicial access advances values of individual dignity, which in turn 
promotes a primary value of democratic societies. See Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of 
Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703, 745 (1980); Ronald Pennock, Due Process, 
Fraternity, and a Kantian Injunction, 18 NOMOS 172 (1977) (discussing the importance of 
the government‘s fair treatment of individuals, including instilling dignity and self-respect). 
 144. Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency‟s Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for 
Minorities, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341, 388 (1990); see also Frank Michelman, The 
Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees:  The Right to Protect One‟s Rights, 1974 DUKE 
L. REV. 527, 547. 
 145. See Finberg, supra note 132, at 357 (―[I]f Americans are to have faith in the judicial 
system, they need to believe that they have access to the courthouse.‖); Meili, supra note 
135, at 74 (―[M]any named plaintiffs have a broader view of success and fairness, measuring 
them in terms of achieving social changes that extend beyond the defendant in their 
particular case.‖). 
 146. Government enforcement ebbs and flows with an administration‘s politics or ability 
to fund such efforts. See Georg Berrisch, Eve Jordan & Rocio Salvador Roldan, E.U. 
Competition and Private Actions for Damages, 24 NW. J. INT‘L L. & BUS. 585, 586 (2004) 
(―[P]ublic authorities lack sufficient resources to investigate and prosecute every single 
infringement of competition rules.‖); Spencer Weber Waller, The Incoherence of Punishment 
in Antitrust, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 207, 230 (2003) (―[E]nforcement priorities change from 
administration to administration, or with appointment of a new Assistant Attorney General 
or FTC chair.‖); see also Joseph P. Bauer, Reflections on the Manifold Means of Enforcing 
the Antitrust Laws:  Too Much, Too Little, or Just Right?, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 303, 
310–11 (2004); Daniel R. Shulman, A New U.S. Administration and U.S. Antitrust 
Enforcement, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 5 (2009). 
 147. See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2012), reh‟g en banc 
denied, 709 F.3d 791 (2013); In re Netflix Privacy Litig., No. 5:11-CV-00379, 2013 WL 
1120801, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2013); In re EasySaver Rewards Litig., 737 F. Supp. 2d 
1159 (S.D. Cal. 2010). 
 148. Consumer Class Action:  Hearings Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the S. Comm. 
on Commerce, 92d Cong. 38 (1971) (statement of Sen. Frank E. Moss, Chair, S. Comm. on 
Commerce). 
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members can afford to undertake years-long litigation on their own, 
especially when individual recovery is minimal.149  However, by allowing 
class counsel to recover attorneys‘ fees based on charitable settlements, 
access to justice is restored.150  Class counsel are key to assisting aggrieved 
individuals bring claims.151  They often ―ferret out‖ the alleged 
wrongdoing152 and advance the fees and costs necessary for suit.153  As the 
Supreme Court has noted, ―[a] class action solves [the] problem‖ that 
―small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a 
solo action prosecuting his or her rights‖ by ―aggregating the relatively 
paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone‘s (usually an 
attorney‘s) labor.‖154  Instead of being fully shut out of the judicial process, 
aggrieved individuals can instead participate in a representative fashion—
whereby class representatives and class counsel work together to vindicate 
class members‘ rights.155 
Charitable settlements also may help overcome financial hurdles to 
judicial access in subsequent cases.  Through the nexus requirement, 
charitable settlements ensure defendants pay for wrongdoing, then 
distribute that payment to a charity whose resources and experience are 
used to advance interests aligned with the underlying goals of the class 
action claim.156  Recognizing the access to justice purpose behind aggregate 
 
 149. See Mathias Reinmann, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the 
Twenty-First Century:  Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 751, 817 
n.351 (2003) (discussing why the high costs of discovery can work against a plaintiff as 
―those with small and medium-sized claims‖ may not be able to fully pursue these claims as 
the costs of discovery will often outweigh the small sum sought in the recovery); Nina 
Yadava, Can You Hear Me Now?  The Courts Send a Stronger Signal Regarding Arbitration 
Class Action Waivers in Consumer Telecommunications Contracts, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 547, 554–55 (2008) (―Without the ability to aggregate these small sums, securing 
legal representation is difficult and the financial incentive of affected individuals to bring 
action is lacking when attorney‘s fees are larger than the amount in controversy.‖). 
 150. See David J. Cook, Class Actions and the Limits of Recovery:  The Glass Jaw of 
Justice (Part 1 of 2), 5 J. LEGAL TECH. RISK MGMT. 1, 21 (2010) (―[C]lass action plaintiffs 
are heavily dependent upon the class counsel in the overall strategic and tactical 
management of the case as supervised by the court.‖); Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. 
Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1186 (2009) (―For such 
negative-value suits, the most important element in ensuring justice is making sure that some 
agent—dare we say, any agent—will rise to the occasion to take up the case.‖). 
 151. See Cook, supra note 150, at 21. 
 152. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) (enumerating criteria courts must consider in 
appointing class counsel, including work to identify or investigate potential claims). 
 153. See, e.g., RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 35, § 3:69. 
 154. Amchen Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (citing Mace v. Van Ru 
Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
 155. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Essentials of Democratic Mass Litigation, 45 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 499, 510 (2012) (crediting Judge Weinstein for describing a formal class 
action as ―an expression of representative democracy‖); Deborah R. Hensler, The 
Globalization of Class Actions:  An Overview, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 7, 
26 (2009) (―[T]he debate over class actions implicates a more fundamental debate about the 
role of the courts in policy making in a representative democracy.‖); cf. Cynthia R. Farina, 
The Consent of the Governed:  Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 987, 1037 (1997) (characterizing class actions as a type of representative democracy). 
 156. See, e.g., In re EasySaver Rewards Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1052 (S.D. Cal. 
2013) (discussing how the proposed charitable settlement advanced ―the objectives of the 
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litigation, many charitable distributions go directly to non-profit providers 
of legal services and are dedicated to providing judicial access for those 
who cannot obtain or afford representation.157  Consequently, charitable 
settlements provide two tiers of judicial access:  (1) class members receive 
the benefit of access to justice for the claim generating the charitable 
settlement, and (2) they (and similarly situated individuals) also can gain 
from increased access in future cases. 
Focusing on compensation as the sole goal of class actions overlooks 
these gains.  Nonetheless, critics often try to redirect arguments about 
access to justice, pointing out class actions limit participation in comparison 
to traditional, non-aggregate cases.158  Because of the representative nature 
of such cases, these critics are accurate in noting not every class member is 
equally heard to the same degree as in individual litigation.159  However, in 
the context of small-stakes claims where charitable settlements usually 
occur, the comparison is not between class actions and individual litigation.  
Rather it is between class actions and no litigation.  In fact, as the Manual 
for Complex Litigation explains, the ―[a]dequacy of the settlement involves 
a comparison of the relief granted relative to what class members might 
have obtained without using the class action process.‖160  Since charitable 
settlements provide greater access to justice than otherwise possible, they 
provide sufficiently valuable relief—even without providing class members 
monetary compensation. 
B.   Charitable Settlements Deter Wrongdoing 
Charitable settlements also deter wrongdoing, further fulfilling class 
actions‘ regulatory objectives.  Class actions are notably different than 
individual civil litigation,161 as deterrent potential is a key reason 
consumers bring aggregate claims.  A study of named plaintiffs in class 
actions bears out how a primary goal of such cases is ensuring that others 
do not experience the same problems in the future—not just receiving 
monetary compensation.162  Focusing on deterrence goals is particularly 
 
underlying statute(s)‖); In re Eunice Train Derailment, No. 00-1267, 2012 WL 70651, at *2 
(W.D. La. Jan. 9, 2012) (discussing how the proposed charitable distribution ―is intimately 
connected to the objectives of this suit and the class‖). 
 157. See, e.g., Lessard v. City of Allen Park, 470 F. Supp. 2d 781, 784 (E.D. Mich. 2007) 
(allowing charitable distribution for the Michigan Bar‘s Access to Justice Fund). 
 158. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Clifford W. Berlow, The Class Action As Political 
Theory, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 753 (2007). 
 159. See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides?  A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 2022 (2007) (―The class action relies on representation to satisfy 
participation demands, but it is not clear how representation can substitute for personal 
participation when participation is valued on dignitary grounds.‖); Alexandra D. Lahav, Due 
Process and the Future of Class Actions, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 545 (2012) (arguing class 
actions undermine autonomy and thus hinder dignity). 
 160. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 44, § 21.62 (listing over thirty 
factors for evaluating a proposed settlement). 
 161. See, e.g., Meili, supra note 135, at 87; Tamara Relis, It‟s Not About the Money!:  A 
Theory of Misconceptions of Plaintiffs‟ Litigation Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 701, 718 (2006). 
 162. Meili, supra note 135, at 87. 
2015] SAVING CHARITABLE SETTLEMENTS 3265 
important for the low individual value claims that most commonly trigger 
charitable settlements.  As Professor Isaacharoff stated, ―More critical than 
the limited compensatory relief now offered in these low-value class actions 
is the prospect that the law would be unable to deter future misconduct 
absent an effective policing mechanism.‖163 
Deterrence is an extension of class actions‘ regulatory function.164  
Congress adopted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to allow individuals 
to serve as private attorneys general—deterring future wrongdoing through 
class actions functioning as ex-post regulation.165  Exposure to potential 
liability incentivizes actors to avoid wrongdoing166 and affects widespread 
change.167  For example, a company may elect to spend more money testing 
a new product or invest in more compliance training to minimize potential 
class action exposure.168  This deterrent effect applies not only to named 
defendants but also to other industry members169 and can extend over 
multiple years, so long as there is ―sustained and repeated enforcement 
activity.‖170 
 
 163. Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 816 (1997). 
 164. YEAZELL, supra note 123, at 232; see also Lopez v. Youngblood, No. CV-F-07-
0474, 2011 WL 10483569, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2011) (―[O]ne important purpose of the 
class action device is that defendants should not benefit from their wrongdoing, and should 
be deterred from doing so by being vulnerable to class actions to remedy their wrongful 
conduct.‖); Abels v. JBC Legal Group, P.C., 227 F.R.D. 541, 546 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 
 165. See, e.g., Deposit Guar. Nat‘l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338–39 (1980); 
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 35, §§ 1.1, 1.8. 
 166. See generally David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation 
Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1890–91 (2002) 
(explaining optimal deterrence maximizes society‘s total welfare by encouraging potential 
wrongdoers to avoid unreasonable risks). 
 167. This widespread effect is not limited to consumer class actions. See Trevor W. 
Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L. REV. 589, 590 
(2005) (―From school desegregation to fair housing, environmental management to 
consumer protection, the impact of the private attorney general litigation is rarely confined to 
the parties in a given case.‖). 
 168. For example, in interviewing corporate representatives in 2000 (when class actions 
mechanisms were more permissive), the Rand Institute found:  ―Corporate 
representatives . . . interviewed said that the burst of new damage class action lawsuits 
ha[d] . . . caus[ed] them to review financial and employment practices.  Likewise, some 
manufacturer representatives noted that heightened concerns about potential class action 
suits have had a positive influence on product design decisions.‖ DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET 
AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS:  PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR 
PRIVATE GAIN 9 (2000), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/ 
monograph_reports/2005/MR969.1.pdf;  see also Edward F. Sherman, Consumer Class 
Actions:  Who Are the Real Winners?, 56 ME. L. REV. 223 (2004) (providing a more 
exhaustive analysis of the Rand report). 
 169. See Michael K. Block & Jonathan S. Feinstein, The Spillover Effect of Antitrust 
Enforcement, 68 REV. ECON. & STAT. 122, 122 (1986) (discussing how antitrust deterrence is 
most effective when targeted at other firms in the same industry as the violator); cf. Jared N. 
Jennings et al., The Deterrent Effects of SEC Enforcement and Class Action Litigation 5 
(Working Paper, 2011), available at http:ssrn.com/abstract=1868578.  A 2011 empirical 
study analyzed both SEC and class action enforcement of securities laws and found class 
actions curb aggressive reporting behaviors of industry peers—not just the corporation sued. 
Id. 
 170. Jennings et al., supra note 169, at 30. 
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Charitable settlements are aligned with class actions‘ deterrence objective 
and provide class members valuable relief by enhancing public welfare.171  
Deterrence gains occur regardless of whether the defendants‘ distribution 
goes to class members or third parties.172  It is the threat of litigation 
coupled with monetary sanctions that matters.173  Potential monetary 
exposure raises transactional costs, which motivates avoiding such behavior 
in the first place.174  This is particularly true for the small individual sum 
class actions best suited for charitable settlements: 
[T]he primary purpose of small claims class actions is not individual 
plaintiff compensation but rather aggregate deterrence of the defendant‘s 
activities.  Compensation is not a primary goal because each class 
member has been harmed such a small amount that getting those funds to 
them may be inefficient and/or class members are unlikely to spend time 
coming forward to claim such small amounts.  However, the aggregate 
effect of the defendant‘s actions may be significant and need to be 
deterred.  Creating a fund that truly penalizes the defendant by fully 
disgorging a significant amount of money serves this deterrent effect 
regardless of where the funds are sent.175 
In fact, charitable distributions‘ deterrence value is potentially greater 
than other nonmonetary relief options.  Optimal deterrence does not occur 
when relief comes in the form of a defendant‘s product or a service that can 
be offered at little or no opportunity cost,176 such as coupon deals.177  
 
 171. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions As Pragmatic Ex Post 
Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63, 96 (2008) (―[D]eterrence enhances public welfare by 
preventing unreasonable risks that cost more to incur than to prevent.‖); Catherine M. 
Sharkey, Punitive Damages As Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 365 (2003) (―Social 
welfare is maximized by minimizing the sum of the costs of (1) losses produced by 
accidents; (2) defendants‘ efforts to exercise care; (3) plaintiffs‘ efforts to take precautionary 
measures; and (4) the costs of administering the torts (or alternative) system.‖). 
 172. See, e.g., In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1355 n.24 
(S.D. Fl. 2011); Rosenberg, supra note 166, at 1892 (―In seeking to minimize the sum of 
accident costs, there is no necessary linkage between the determination of liability and the 
distribution of damages. The two functions are severable and distinct.  How damages are 
distributed among plaintiffs—whether averaged, allotted by need, apportioned according to 
some other criterion, or not distributed at all—is generally (with the exception of its effect on 
plaintiff incentives) irrelevant to achieving deterrence.‖); cf. David Rosenberg, The Causal 
Connection in Mass Exposure Cases:  A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. 
L. REV. 849, 873 (1984). 
 173. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA‟s Impact on Litigation As a Public Good, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2517, 2550 (2008) (explaining how the threat of monetary class actions 
―deters risky behaviors . . . and results in safer products and better corporate practices‖); see 
also William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?:  A Positive Externalities Theory of the 
Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 711 (2006). 
 174. Jennings et al., supra note 169, at 30. 
 175. In re Dep‘t of Veterans Affairs (VA) Data Theft Litig., 653 F. Supp. 2d 58, 60–61 
(D.D.C. 2009); see also Gilles & Friedman, supra note 109, at 105 (asserting that real value 
of class actions lies not in compensation but in deterring the defendant-wrongdoer by 
―caus[ing it] to internalize the social costs of its actions‖). 
 176. Stephen Calkins, An Enforcement Official‟s Reflections on Antitrust Class Actions, 
39 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 445 (1997). 
 177. Id.; Jois, supra note 27, at 270 n.41 (―[O]ptimal deterrence is not reached when there 
are unclaimed coupons (because the tortfeasor only bears a cost if a coupon is cashed in) but 
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Reverters, which provide no guaranteed payouts,178 are not better 
deterrents, nor is injunctive relief.179  Instead, the potential for real financial 
exposure, regardless of whether the money goes to class members, a 
charity, or a non-profit, achieves more deterrence—a benefit to class 
members that does not require receiving a $5 check first. 
Thus, charitable settlements are essential stopgaps to safeguarding 
deterrence.180  They optimize deterrence by ensuring the defendants are 
exposed to potential litigation for all types of wrongdoing, not just 
wrongdoing where damages can be efficiently distributed to individual class 
members.181  A requirement that all settlements first distribute funds to 
class members, however, runs the risk of under-deterrence.182  Individual 
recovery and optimal deterrence are conflicting goals.183  When individual 
compensation becomes the primary goal, less optimal deterrence results 
because the threat of litigation disappears if charitable settlements are not 
allowed.  Few lawyers would file claims that have no effective resolution 
prospect.184 
 
that optimal deterrence could be reached when there is undistributed money (because the 
tortfeasor has already internalized the costs of his tortuous conduct).‖). 
 178. See, e.g., Diamond Chem. Co., Inc. v. Akzo Nobel Chems. B.V., 517 F. Supp. 2d 
212, 218 (D.D.C. 2007) (discussing how reversion does not fulfill deterrence goals); 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07 (2010) (―One option is to return 
the remaining funds to the defendant even when the settlement does not contain a provision 
for reversion to the defendant. That option, however, would undermine the deterrence 
function of class actions and the underlying substantive-law basis of the recovery by 
rewarding the alleged wrongdoer simply because distribution to the class would not be 
viable.‖); Boies & Keith, supra note 23, at 269 (―Reversion to the defendant undermines the 
deterrent effect of class actions.‖). 
 179. Cf. Neil K. Gehlawat, Note, Monetary Damages and the (b)(2) Class Action:  A 
Closer Look at Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1551 (2012) (discussing how 
injunctive relief does not provide the same deterrence as monetary damages). 
 180. See Burch, supra note 173, at 2551 (discussing the harm resulting from minimizing 
class actions‘ deterrence potential, given ―the American system‘s heavy reliance on litigation 
as ex post regulation‖). 
 181. See Stephen D. Susman, Prosecuting the Antitrust Class Action, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 
1513, 1515–16 (1980) (―[W]ithout Rule 23 the small claimant [would] be deprived of 
effective relief.‖). 
 182. See, e.g., Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708, 719 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(discussing the underdeterrence risks associated with denying class certification); Genevieve 
G. York-Erwin, Note, The Choice-of-Law Problem(s) in the Class Action Context, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1793, 1800 (2009) (―An economic analysis suggests that without this 
collective mechanism, corporations would not fully internalize the costs of their conduct, 
causing inefficiencies, undercompensation, underdeterrence, and other social losses.‖). 
 183. Gilles & Friedman, supra note 109, at 107 (―[T]he introduction of compensationalist 
norms into class action policymaking not only is gratuitous, but also undermines the efficacy 
of many rules and practices as deterrents.‖); Rosenberg, supra note 166, at 1890 (discussing 
the conflict between optimal deterrence and compensation in terms of optimal insurance 
theory). 
 184. The economic reality is that if class counsel cannot expect potential recovery for the 
vast time and monetary outlay associated with pursuing a class claim, attorneys simply will 
not take the case. See Sofia Adrogué & Hon. Caroline Baker, Litigation in the 21st Century:  
The Jury Trial, the Training & the Experts, ADVOC., Fall 2011, at 12; Bartholomew, supra 
note 20, at 2149–50 (discussing how increased risks disincentive counsel from pursuing 
claims); Melnick, supra note 134, at 776 (discussing how class action attorneys are paid 
from settlements, thus making the success of the case relevant to an attorney‘s decision to 
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Critics often overlook deterrence gains in challenging charitable 
settlements.  For example, Public Citizen, a repeat objector to cy pres and 
charitable settlements, took issue with the proposed settlement for antitrust 
violations in In re Toys “R” Us Antitrust Litigation.185  The settlement 
included an earmarked distribution of $36.6 million to Toys for Tots.186  
Public Citizen contended the settlement only provided class members 
―ephemeral‖ relief.187  The court rejected such a narrow definition of 
benefit: 
[I]n claiming that the method of distribution means that consumers will 
not benefit from the Settlements, [Public Citizen] ignores the deterrent 
effect that inheres in the defendants‘ large payout of toys and cash.  The 
Settlements, with their significant monetary cost to defendants, must be 
evaluated not only in terms of their direct value to the public but also in 
terms of their deterrent effect on antitrust violators, an effect of value to 
consumers.188 
Similarly, objectors in In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation189 
ignored deterrence gains in attacking an earmarked charitable 
distribution.190  There, as described previously,191 the bulk of a $410 
million settlement was dispersed to identifiable class members, with a 
portion earmarked for distribution to organizations that promote financial 
literacy.192  This settlement portion represented the amount allocable to 
class members who could not be identified because the defendant‘s older 
transaction data was not searchable.193 
In rejecting objectors‘ challenges to the settlement, the trial court cited 
Professor Fitzpatrick‘s explanation of charitable settlements‘ deterrent 
value, which echoed Professor Rubenstein: 
In small-stakes cases, the most important function of the class action 
device is not compensation of class members but deterrence of 
wrongdoing . . . [and] if defendants did not pay someone—even third 
parties like cy pres charities—for such harms, then defendants would have 
every incentive to cause such harms in the future . . . .  Thus, in such 
[small-stakes] cases, the most important thing is that the defendant pays 
 
undertake representation).  As challenges to charitable distributions mount, the safer course 
for class counsel is to diversify the risk by filing other types of cases, rather than invest 
limited resources in an uncertain terrain. See Nantiya Ruan & Nancy Reichman, Hours 
Equity Is the New Pay Equity, 59 VILL. L. REV. 35, 75 (2014) (discussing how greater 
judicial scrutiny means ―fewer private plaintiffs‘ attorneys are willing to risk the high costs 
of these cases‖). 
 185. 191 F.R.D. 347 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 186. Id. at 349. 
 187. Id. at 355. 
 188. Id. at 356. 
 189. 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
 190. Id. at 1354–57. 
 191. See supra Part I.B. 
 192. In re Checking Account, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 1355.  This case is another example of a 
court using the generic term cy pres to discuss a settlement where the charitable distribution 
is not limited to a remainder.  Hence, the charitable distribution involved in the case is more 
accurately described as an earmarked charitable settlement. 
 193. Id. at 1354. 
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for the wrongs it has perpetrated—it is less important who the defendant 
pays.194 
Stated differently, ―ex ante, the individual would rationally prefer a legal 
system that allocates enforcement resources to prevent unreasonable risk 
rather than merely to compensate it.‖195  Thus, the more substantiated 
position recognizes charitable settlements provide valuable deterrence. 
In sum, charitable settlements are well-aligned with class actions‘ 
regulatory function.  They are an equitable distribution method that furthers 
individuals‘ ability to vindicate statutory rights and regulate behavior, by 
deterring future wrongdoing and disgorging ill-gotten gains.  Thus, 
theoretical arguments that class actions should be limited to cases where 
direct monetary payouts to class members are feasible undermine class 
actions‘ larger utility. 
C.   Collusion and Procedural Concerns Are Unfounded 
As detailed above, charitable settlements offer class members valuable 
relief by promoting access to justice and deterring wrongdoing by using ill-
gotten gains to effectuate collective goals.  Precluding charitable 
settlements would significantly undercut class actions‘ regulatory 
enforcement potential. 
Nonetheless, challenges to charitable settlements often build on the faulty 
premise that such settlements do not benefit class members because they do 
not compensate them.  Class action objectors commonly repeat two lines of 
attack.  First, charitable settlements allegedly incentivize class counsel and 
defendants to ―sell out‖ class members.  From there, some critics assert 
such settlements entice counsel to forego vigorously advocating on behalf 
of class members—thus raising due process concerns.196  The remainder of 
this part focuses on the flaws in these derivative arguments, refuting the 
remaining theoretical obstacles to judicial approval of charitable 
settlements. 
1.   Collusion Fears Are Overblown 
Critics still hold onto a narrow definition of benefit by arguing charitable 
settlements incentivize class counsel to ―sell out‖ the class.197  This attack 
recycles an oft-asserted criticism of small-sum class actions:  class 
 
 194. Id. at 1355 n.24 (citing Supp. Decl. of Prof. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, ¶¶ 6, 9). 
 195. David L. Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action:  The Only Option for Mass 
Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 840 (2002). 
 196. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief, supra note 17, at 650–51. 
 197. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars:  The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class 
Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1373–74 (1995); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, 
Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1112 (1996); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Susan 
P. Koniak, Rule of Law:  The Latest Class Action Scam, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 1995, at 11 
(―Paying the class‘s lawyers to sell out their clients is invariably cheaper for defendants than 
paying the class.‖). 
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attorneys receive millions while class members receive little or nothing.198  
Assuming a charitable settlement is by definition ―selling out,‖ any such 
settlement is circumstantial evidence of collusion between class counsel and 
defendants.  Some further claim charitable settlements are ―cheaper‖ for 
defendants because they avoid payouts to individual class members.199 
Such collusion concerns in the charitable settlement context are more 
perception than reality.  While class actions potentially can create conflicts 
of interest, this does not justify assuming charitable settlements are 
collusive.  A charitable settlement can represent the full, fair value of the 
class‘ claims, especially when administrative costs exceed individual 
compensation.200  Safeguards already exist to prevent the collusive behavior 
feared by critics. 
First, the process for negotiating attorneys‘ fees is the same regardless of 
the settlement structure.  Though no express prohibition against concurrent 
fee and settlement negotiations exists, in many class actions, the attorneys‘ 
fees discussions are deferred until after all settlement terms are fully 
negotiated.201  There is no guarantee defendants will agree to generous class 
counsel compensation when the settlement includes a charitable 
distribution.  Such settlements are often also overseen by mediators, further 
offsetting potential collusion concerns.202 
 
 198. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability:  Reconciling Exit, Voice, 
and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 371–72 (2000) 
(―[W]here the plaintiffs‘ attorney was once seen as a public-regarding private attorney 
general, increasingly the more standard depiction is as a profit-seeking entrepreneur, capable 
of opportunistic actions and often willing to subordinate the interests of class members to the 
attorney‘s own economic self-interest.‖); Bruce L. Hay, The Theory of Fee Regulation in 
Class Action Settlements, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1429, 1433 (1997); Bruce Hay & David 
Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions:  Reality and 
Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1390 (2000). 
 199. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, When Lawyers Cut Their Clients Out of the Deal, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/us/supreme-court-may-hear-
novel-class-action-case.html?_r=0 (quoting objectors‘ counsel to Facebook settlement). 
 200. See, e.g., Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 2011) (describing 
charitable settlement ―[i]n lieu of a cost-prohibitive distribution to the plaintiff class‖ where 
defendants‘ maximum liability per person would be roughly three cents). 
 201. See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon, 295 F.R.D. 112, 138 (E.D. 
La. 2013) (―[T]he Parties did not begin to negotiate fees until they had already delivered an 
otherwise complete settlement agreement to the Court.‖); In re Sw. Airlines Voucher Litig., 
No. 11 C 8176, 2013 WL 4510197, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 2013) (―It is undisputed that 
there was no negotiation regarding attorney‘s fees until after the parties had reached 
agreement on settlement of the class members‘ claims.‖); In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales 
Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 335 (3d Cir. 1998) (―There is no indication the 
parties began to negotiate attorneys‘ fees until after they had finished negotiating the 
settlement agreement.‖); Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207, 233 (D.N.J. 
2005) (―[T]he parties did not commence negotiations on the amount of attorneys‘ fees and 
expenses that MassMutual would agree to pay until all material terms of the Settlement had 
been agreed upon, about one year after settlement negotiations began.‖). 
 202. See, e.g., In re EasySaver Rewards Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1054 (S.D. Cal. 
2013) (―There were numerous settlement proceedings, several of which were presided over 
by well-respected retired district court judges and magistrate judges. By all accounts, the 
settlement resulted from an arms-length negotiation process with the benefit of the class 
members in mind.‖). 
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Second, courts explicitly evaluate whether the settlement is the product 
of collusion.203  This requirement is hardly pro forma.  The district judge 
acts as a fiduciary of the class; if a trial judge fails in executing his duty, 
circuit courts will reverse the decision.204  Courts have approved 
settlements and still cut requests for attorney fees, which also minimizes 
risks of selling out the class.205 
Moreover, the approval process is particularly arduous for charitable 
settlements, which already receive heightened scrutiny.206  Objectors in 
such cases are commonplace, causing courts to provide more exhaustive 
review given the very likely appeal stemming from any settlement 
approval.207  At the same time, defendants have reason to only promote 
class settlements that satisfy the Rule 23 settlement approval process.  A 
collusive settlement creates problems with the class‘s adequacy of 
representation—negating the validity of the settlement.208  The resources 
defendants spent reaching an agreeable settlement, litigating the 
settlement‘s preliminary approval, and negotiating the settlement notice 
would be for naught if ultimately disapproved by the court. 
Third, collusion assumes agreement between class and defendants‘ 
counsel, at the expense of class members; it takes two to collude.209  While 
defendants are motivated to provide the smallest settlement possible,210 the 
amount defendants pay is the same whether it is a monetary distribution or a 
 
 203. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat‘l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 2002); Joel 
A. v. Giuliani, 218 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2000); In re Cell Phone Terminations Fee Cases, 
180 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1118 (2010). 
 204. See, e.g., Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2002); In re 
Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 231 (3d Cir. 2001); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 823 
F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1987); Stewart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 756 F.2d 1285, 1293 (7th Cir. 
1985). 
 205. See, e.g., Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 737 (1986) (upholding district court‘s 
decision to waive attorney‘s fees completely); Cobell v. Norton, 407 F. Supp. 2d 140, 177 
(D.D.C. 2005); Garabedian v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 118 Cal. App. 4th 123, 127 (2004). 
 206. See, e.g., In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 
2011) (listing ―warning signs‖ to consider in evaluating class action settlements); Mirfasihi 
v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 450 F.3d 745, 747 (7th Cir. 2006) (same); see also Foer, supra note 
95, at 88 (―The cy pres remedy today is coming under closer public and legal scrutiny than at 
any previous time.‖). 
 207. See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 835 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 8 (2013) (overruling objectors‘ challenges after lengthy examination); In re 
Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1335–36 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (same). 
 208. See Debra Lyn Bassett, The Defendant‟s Obligation to Ensure Adequate 
Representation in Class Actions, 74 UMKC L. REV. 511, 539 (2006) (discussing how the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments section 41 applies to both defendants and plaintiffs).  
Professor Bassett goes on to explain why defendants, thus, have an interest in ensuring 
adequate representation:  ―[T]he Restatement gives a defendant no place to hide when the 
defendant knew that the class members were not accorded adequacy of representation—
under such circumstances, the judgment is not binding on the inadequately represented class 
members.‖ Id. 
 209. See Brian W. Warwick, Class Action Settlement Collusion:  Let‟s Not Sue Class 
Counsel Quite Yet . . . ., 22 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 605, 611 (1999). 
 210. See Jacob Kreutzer, The Difficulties of Encouraging Cooperation in a Zero-Sum 
Game, 65 ME. L. REV. 147, 159 (2012) (describing ―the settlement range [as] the range from 
the smallest offer the plaintiff should accept and the largest offer the defendant should 
make‖). 
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charitable settlement.  While charitable settlements minimize administrative 
costs possibly paid by defendants, defendants still fund the settlement, pay 
for notice, and pay attorneys‘ fees.211 
Fourth, fears of defendants pushing for charitable settlements over 
monetary distributions are overblown because not all Rule 23(b)(3) cases 
qualify for charitable settlements.  Such settlements are the exception to the 
rule.212  They are limited to cases with distribution problems.213  While the 
guidelines for the trigger test can be shored up, as discussed in Part III, even 
as presently applied, this requirement significantly restrains such 
settlements‘ growth. 
Finally, collusion is less likely with charitable settlements than with 
alternative, nonmonetary distribution options like reverters.  Charitable 
settlements still financially motivate class counsel to push for a high 
distribution.  As the settlement amount rises, so does class counsel‘s 
payday, which is based on the value of the settlement.214  At the same time, 
defendants will try to limit the settlement amount.  This is unlike reversion 
provision settlements, where undistributed funds return to the defendants‘ 
coffers.  Reverters incentivize the parties to falsely inflate settlement fund 
values for judicial approval.  Such provisions ―decouple‖215 class counsel‘s 
incentive to maximize the settlement amount and its corresponding 
deterrent and disgorgement impact.216  Hence, charitable settlements 
actually minimize collusion concerns as compared to other forms of class 
action settlement. 
On the whole, accusations of collusion are almost routine in challenging 
charitable settlements.  Yet fears of ―selling out‖ class members to receive a 
generous payday have not necessarily materialized into realistic concerns.  
At the least, objectors and critics should face the burden of coming up with 
actual proof of collusion before removing this valuable distribution option 
from the judicial arsenal. 
 
 211. Cf. Warwick, supra note 209, at 611 (―[F]or collusion to influence the settlement of 
a class action, the defendant must also be willing to actively participate.‖). 
 212. Thus, in settled class actions, particularly for antitrust and securities claims, ―the 
great bulk of the money received from the defendants actually is distributed to class 
members.‖ Miller, supra note 124, at 667. 
 213. See supra Part I.B (discussing the ―trigger‖ requirement for charitable settlements). 
 214. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 215. Int‘l Precious Metals Corp. v. Waters, 530 U.S. 1223 (2000) (statement of 
O‘Connor, J., respecting the denial of the petition for a writ of certiorari).  
 216. Such a falsely inflated settlement value was rejected by the District Court of Maine 
in Sylvester v. CIGNA Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D. Me. 2005).  The settlement was 
presented as a $3.4 million opt-in fund but included a reverter. Id. at 38.  As a result of the 
reverter, class members received $449,159.81 while the defendants would have received 
$1,644,601.94. Id. at 47.  Recognizing such a settlement structure would provide ―real 
value‖ to defendants and class counsel but provide little deterrent impact, the Court denied 
the settlement as unfair. Id. at 53. 
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2.   Charitable Distributions Do Not Create Procedural Problems 
Beyond collusion, some contend charitable settlements violate 
substantive due process217 by improperly expanding class members‘ 
substantive rights and foregoing proof of individual damages.218  This 
critique focuses on the Rules Enabling Act, which defines the scope of 
procedural rules the judicial branch may adopt.219  Since charitable 
distributions would not occur in individual litigation, allowing them in class 
actions supposedly makes them more like improper civil fines than true 
damages.220  However, this position advances an overly narrow definition 
of the Rules Enabling Act and fails to acknowledge that charitable 
settlements do not alter individualized damage calculations.221 
First, Rules Enabling Act arguments face a high bar; the Supreme Court 
has rejected virtually all such arguments.222  This is not surprising given 
judicial authority is generously defined to include ―the ability to adopt 
procedural rules that impact the future conduct of lawyers and parties in 
judicial proceedings.‖223  In a recent opinion, Justice Scalia confirmed this 
 
 217. Some critics of charitable settlements also claim failing to provide class members 
monetary distributions raises procedural due process problems. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief, 
supra note 17, at 650 (―[U]se of cy pres relief in class actions also gives rise to fatal 
violations of procedural due process.‖).  These challenges are easily dismissed.  Procedural 
due process does not create a mandate for monetary distributions.  Rather, it simply requires 
class members ―receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the 
litigation.‖ Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).  A charitable 
settlement should satisfy procedural due process so long as class members can opt-out and 
the settlement notice spells out who receives the charitable settlement and for what purpose. 
See In re Vitamin Cases, 107 Cal. App. 4th 820, 829 (2003) (―The requirements of due 
process [are] met when, as in this case, the notice explain[s] that the proposed settlement 
provides solely for the distribution of funds to nonprofit organizations and foundations, 
states that there will be no payments to individual [California] consumers, and informs the 
class members of their options of opting out or objecting.‖). 
 218. See, e.g., Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief, supra note 17, at 646. 
 219. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b) (2012) (providing that the ―Supreme Court shall have the 
power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in 
the United States district courts[,] . . . [and] [s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify 
any substantive right‖).  As Justice Brandeis stated:  ―Congress has no power to declare 
substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or 
‗general,‘ be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the 
Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.‖ Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 220. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief, supra note 17, at 646; cf. Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 
Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 481 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 221. See Donald L. Doernberg, “The Tempest”:  Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, 
P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.:  The Rules Enabling Act Decision That Added to the 
Confusion—But Should Not Have, 44 AKRON L. REV. 1147, 1183 (2011) (discussing 
arguments that the Rules Enabling Act uses a narrow definition no court has ever adopted); 
see also Tidmarsh, supra note 17, at 571 (discussing how arguments against class actions 
rooted in the Rules Enabling Act run contrary to the Act‘s current interpretation); ADVISORY 
COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 22, at 266 n.36 (explaining that cy pres settlements do 
―not invent[] a new ‗remedy‘ to be used in litigated actions‖). 
 222. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407 
(2010) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). 
 223. John H. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judicial Procedure Are Void 
Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276 (1928). For a more thorough discussion of the Rules 
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broad judicial power, noting how courts can design ―[a] judicial process for 
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly 
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.‖224 
The Rules Enabling Act does not prohibit federal judges from fashioning 
―procedural devices.‖225  Judges‘ equitable discretion over how to distribute 
settlement funds is well within the judiciary‘s procedure-making power.  
Such discretion falls within the ―justly administering remedy and redress‖ 
language—approving a charitable settlement is administering a remedy.226  
Moreover, charitable settlements do not ―add, subtract, or define any of the 
elements necessary‖227 but rather distribute damages already properly 
defined under the substantive laws at issue. 
Approving charitable settlement distributions under Rule 23 is analogous 
to other procedural rules that do not violate the Rules Enabling Act.  For 
example, McCalla v. Royal MacCabees Life Insurance Co.228 evaluated a 
Nevada law governing when a litigant may make a motion for prejudgment 
interest.229  The Ninth Circuit held Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), 
not Nevada law, controlled the timing of prejudgment interests—even 
though it would result in an overall larger amount paid out.230  The court 
explained the Rule defines ―when and how‖ interest can be reviewed.231  
Consequently, it did not violate the Rules Enabling Act ―because its 
application affects only the process of enforcing litigants‘ rights and not the 
rights themselves.‖232  Similarly, charitable settlements are concerned with 
―when and how‖ damages are distributed, not how damages are quantified, 
which is properly left to the requirements of the underlying claim.233  Thus, 
 
Enabling Act in the context of class actions, see Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, 
The Constitutional Limits of Judicial Rulemaking:  The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort 
Settlements Negotiated Under Federal Rule 23, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 461, 475 (1997). 
 224. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407 (quoting Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14). 
 225. See id. at 420.  Further, there is no true conflict between the substantive claims and 
the procedural requirements; thus, unlike many Rules Enabling Act arguments, there are not 
concerns of conflicting federal procedural requirements and state laws.  Cf. id. at 400–01 
(comparing New York state law prohibiting certain class actions with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23).  
The underlying state claims now being heard in federal court post-CAFA are primarily silent 
on questions of charitable distributions.  Hence, without an express conflict, there are also no 
overlapping Rules Enabling Act/Erie-type problems. 
 226. But cf. Boies & Keith, supra note 23, at 274 (discussing why Rules Enabling Act 
attacks on charitable distributions are unfounded). 
 227. McCalla v. Royal MacCabees Life Ins. Co., 369 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 228. 69 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 229. Id. at 1135. 
 230. Id. at 1136. 
 231. Id. at 1135 (quoting Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 762 (9th Cir. 
2003)). 
 232. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 233. See Boies & Keith, supra note 23, at 274. 
There are broader problems with the Rules Enabling Act attack.  Even ardent 
opponents of class action cy pres awards concede that, rather than transforming 
underlying substantive law claims into a civil fine, the disposition of unclaimed 
property is a ―legal issue wholly distinct from the substantive law enforced in the 
suit that [gives] rise to the unclaimed award in the first place.‖ 
Id. (quoting Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief, supra note 17).  In this way, charitable settlements 
can be construed as analogous to ancillary relief, like administrative agencies that utilize 
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charitable settlements should not be seen as a violation of the Rules 
Enabling Act. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Rules Enabling Act argument 
stems from the nomenclature problems that have long since plagued 
charitable distributions.  Not only have cy pres distributions and charitable 
distributions been conflated, some courts also blur fluid recovery and 
charitable settlements234—adding mud to already murky waters.  Fluid 
recovery is a broad concept that covers both damage calculation and 
disbursement.  It has three steps.  The class (1) aggregates a damage 
calculation for purposes of certification; (2) uses a summary claim 
procedure; and (3) distributes claims to indirectly benefit class members.235  
The distribution can come in multiple forms, including price rollbacks, 
coupons, and charitable payouts.236 
The first step of fluid recovery, aggregating damages, potentially triggers 
Rules Enabling Act issues.237  A quick example highlights this problem.  
Assume class member A‘s and class member B‘s damages were $2 and $6 
respectively; using fluid recovery would generate aggregate damages of $8, 
meaning $4 per member.  Accordingly, under fluid recovery, critics argue 
that class member A would be overcompensated at the expense of class 
member B, thus altering ―defendants‘ substantive right to pay damages 
reflective of their actual liability.‖238  Consequently, some jurisdictions 
reject the first step of fluid recovery239 or, at a minimum, greatly constrict 
its application.240 
 
ancillary remedies.  While these remedies are not expressly authorized by statutes, 
administrative agencies can seek ancillary remedies to justly administer remedy and redress.  
George W. Dent, Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law:  A Study in Federal Remedies, 
67 MINN. L. REV. 865 (1983).  For instance, like ancillary remedies, charitable settlements 
deter future violations, help preserve the status quo, and most importantly, benefit social 
good aimed at fighting violations.  This analogy further supports the argument that charitable 
settlements are procedural rather than substantive and do not disrupt the Rules Enabling Act. 
 234. See, e.g., CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:  CIVIL 2D 
§ 1784 (3d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2014). 
 235. See, e.g., California v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460, 472–73 (1986); JEROLD 
S. SOLOVY ET AL., Class Action Controversies, in CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL CIVIL 
PRACTICE (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 499, 1994). 
 236. See, e.g., Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1305 
(9th Cir. 1990); In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 214 F.R.D. 614, 620 
(W.D. Wash. 2003). 
 237. See 2 MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 53, § 8:16 (―Calculating damages in the aggregate 
cannot be squared with the Rules Enabling Act where class members‘ alleged damages can 
be reliably quantified only through individualized proof.‖). 
 238. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 231–32 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 239. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1008 (2d Cir. 1973) (rejecting fluid 
recovery); see also Dumas v. Albers Med., Inc., No. 03-0640-CV-W-GAF, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 33482, at *7 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 7, 2005) (stating fluid recovery ―is not appropriate 
when it is used to assess the damages of the class without proof of damages suffered by 
individual class members‖ and class action was otherwise unmanageable); City of 
Philadelphia v. Am. Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 72 (D.N.J. 1971).  While courts have followed 
Eisen, the case‘s arguments on fluid recovery have been hotly criticized. See, e.g., Managing 
the Large Class Action:  Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 HARV. L. REV. 426, 453 (1973). 
 240. For example, in the Ninth Circuit fluid recovery is allowed when ―conventional 
methods of proof are demonstrably unavailable.‖ Guiterrez v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. C 07-
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However, charitable settlements are distinct from fluid recovery in a 
simple but important way.  They impact disbursement, not damage 
calculations.241  Rule 23 requirements are not altered by a charitable 
settlement.  The class is still obligated to show common issues predominate 
for purposes of certification.242  As a result, the distribution method does 
not impact defendants‘ obligation to pay a settlement reflective of their 
actual liability.  Rather, as the Third Circuit explains, ―a district court‘s 
certification of a settlement simply recognizes the parties‘ deliberate 
decision to bind themselves . . . without engaging in any substantive 
adjudication of the underlying causes of action.‖243  Hence, arguments that 
class members cannot show they have suffered damages are red herrings. 
Since charitable distributions benefit class members without raising 
substantiated concerns regarding collusion or due process, no theoretical 
legal barriers to approving such settlements exist.  Given their ability to 
advance the goals of the underlying substantive claims,244 charitable 
settlements are a necessary distribution method for class actions.  That said, 
there are still ways to refine such settlements to provide clearer contours for 
their application.  These refinements are described in Part III. 
III.   PROTECTING CHARITABLE SETTLEMENTS THROUGH CLEARER 
GUIDELINES 
Despite the foregoing, some courts reject charitable settlements outright 
or discourage them by denying accompanying attorneys‘ fee 
applications.245  While the majority of trial courts have demonstrated a 
willingness to approve charitable settlements, even these decisions are laden 
 
05923 WHA, 2009 WL 1247040, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2009); cf. Hilao v. Estate of 
Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 782–86 (9th Cir. 1996) (allowing statistical sampling for class 
damages because of the ―extraordinarily unusual nature of the case‖). 
 241. See, e.g., Nat‘l Ass‘n of Consumer Advocates, Standards & Guidelines for 
Litigating & Settling Consumer Class Actions, 176 F.R.D. 375, 391 (1997) (―Those issues 
are very different from the question of cy pres distribution of unclaimed funds, an issue 
which does not subject defendants to greater liability or alter their substantive rights.‖). 
 242. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (setting forth predominance requirements for monetary 
class actions). 
 243. In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 173 n.8 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 312 (3d Cir. 2011)). 
 244. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (explaining that ―[p]rivate 
enforcement . . . provides a necessary supplement‖ to public enforcement); George D. 
Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics:  The „Salvage‟ Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARV. L. 
REV. 658, 663 (1956) (―Every successful suit duly rewarded encourages other suits to redress 
misconduct and by the same token discourages misconduct which would occasion suit.‖); 
Salil K. Mehra, Deterrence:  The Private Remedy and International Antitrust Cases, 40 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 275, 280 (2002) (―U.S. [antitrust] law has adopted rules that favor 
the aim of deterring wrongful conduct over the aim of providing recovery.‖); Fred O. 
Williams, Adelphia Faces 22 Shareholder Lawsuits, BUFF. NEWS, Apr. 28, 2002, at B13 
(―The SEC is overwhelmed . . . nothing would be done except for class-action lawyers.‖). 
 245.  See, e.g., In re Dep‘t of Veterans Affairs (VA) Data Theft Litig., 653 F. Supp. 2d 
58, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (reducing fee request); Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., No. C11-1726 RS, 
2012 WL 5838198, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2012) (discussing how attorneys‘ fee requests 
in a charitable settlement raises ―serious concerns‖). 
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with inconsistent standards.  This inconsistency—coupled with Justice 
Roberts‘s call to arms—has emboldened objectors.246 
Objectors pose a particular problem for charitable settlements.  Objector 
allegations of collusion or unsubstantiated claims that such settlements are 
inferior to monetary distributions have slowed the settlement approval 
process and generated unnecessary fees and expenses while wasting judicial 
resources.247  In refuting objections to a recent earmarked charitable 
settlement, Judge Gertner noted: 
[P]rofessional objectors can levy what is effectively a tax on class action 
settlements, a tax that has no benefit to anyone other than to the objectors. 
Literally nothing is gained from the cost:  Settlements are not restructured 
and the class, on whose benefit the appeal is purportedly raised, gains 
nothing.248 
Rather than endlessly relitigating whether the charitable settlement 
concept is appropriate, settlement approval should instead focus on the 
particular proposed distribution.  To assist in this evaluation, this part offers 
clearer standards for ensuring charitable settlements achieve their fullest 
regulatory utility.  These proposals focus on three aspects of a charitable 
settlement:  (1) the trigger for such a settlement; (2) evaluating the proposed 
recipient; and (3) computing attorneys‘ fees. 
Once a charitable settlement and accompanying fee petition meet these 
guidelines, objections should be limited to a pay-to-play basis.  Objectors 
should be responsible for attorneys‘ fees and costs generated responding to 
meritless objections.  This ensures the settlement approval process does not 
devolve into unwarranted lengthy satellite litigation.249 
 
 246. See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2012); In re Netflix 
Privacy Litig., No. 5:11-CV-00379 EJD, 2013 WL 1120801, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 
2013); In re EasySaver Rewards Litig., 737 F. Supp. 2d 1159 (S.D. Cal. 2010). 
 247. See, e.g., In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1336–37 
(S.D. Fla. 2011) (rejecting objectors‘ lengthy challenges to the reasonableness of the 
settlement, the amount of the settlement, settlement notice, the scope‘s release, fee petition, 
and charitable distributions ―find[ing] that they are both completely unsupported in the 
record (no Objector having submitted even a single affidavit to provide facts or expert 
opinions supporting their positions) and unpersuasive as to the substance of their 
complaints‖). 
 248. See id. at 1361 n.30 (quoting Barnes v. Fleet Bos. Fin. Corp., No. 01-10395-NG, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71072, at *3–4 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2006)); see also In re 
UnitedHealth Group Inc. PSLRA Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1108–09 (D. Minn. 2009); 
O‘Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 214 F.R.D. 266, 295 n.26 (E.D. Pa. 2003); Snell v. 
Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. Civ. 97-2784 (RLE), 2000 WL 1336640, at *9 (D. 
Minn. Sept. 8, 2000); Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 975 (E.D. 
Tex. 2000). 
 249. The torrid procedural history of Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp. is a telling 
example of how objections to charitable settlements can exhaust valuable judicial resources 
without generating gain. 450 F.3d 745 (7th Cir. 2006).  There, plaintiffs alleged the 
defendant improperly sold mortgage information to third-party companies, which then 
marketed financial products to two sub-classes of mortgagers. Id. at 746–47.  The parties 
eventually negotiated a settlement totaling $2.4 million, whereby one class would receive 
monetary compensation and the other class‘s relief was an earmarked charitable distribution. 
Id. at 747.  If distributed to the entire class, the settlement would have amounted to 17 cents 
per class member. Id.  The trial court approved the settlement‘s fairness, but objectors 
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A.   Clearer Trigger for Impracticability 
First, recognizing charitable settlements as the exception rather than the 
rule raises the question, at what point should the exception apply?  Stated 
differently, what is the ―trigger‖ requirement for a charitable settlement?  
Clearer, more consistent standards are needed to identify cases where 
charitable settlements are appropriate.250  Net-zero cases, where the 
administrative costs exhaust the settlement, should regularly trigger 
charitable distributions.251  Yet as mentioned in Part I, objectors routinely 
challenge such settlements for not distributing funds to class members 
first.252 
Currently, courts import the cy pres standard for all types of charitable 
distributions, defining the trigger as the point at which a monetary 
distribution becomes ―unlawful, impossible, or impracticable.‖253  Since, as 
previously discussed,254 charitable distributions are distinguishable from cy 
pres, importing definitions from the trust context is illogical, but more 
importantly, provides little concrete guidance.  Even in the trust context, 
there is ―significant variance in the degree of impossibility or 
impracticability required‖ to trigger cy pres.255  In fact, commentators do 
not even agree on whether the cy pres doctrine is expanding or 
narrowing.256 
How the terms are used outside the cy pres context is equally unhelpful.  
For example, in contract law, the doctrine of ―impracticability‖ requires an 
unforeseen supervening circumstance not within the contemplation of the 
 
appealed not once but three times. Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 551 F.3d 682, 685 (7th 
Cir. 2008); Mirfasihi, 450 F.3d at 746; Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 782 
(7th Cir. 2004).  Ultimately, six years after the settlement agreement, in a third opinion, the 
Seventh Circuit affirmed the charitable distribution, finding it fair and adequate given the 
significant risks associated with successful prosecution of the underlying claims. Mirfasihi, 
551 F.3d at 685. 
 250. Compare McLaughlin, supra note 60, at 465–77 (discussing how clarifying the 
trigger for when a conservation easement is ―impossible or impracticable‖ would ―yield 
more predictable results‖). 
 251. See, e.g., In re Netflix Privacy, 2013 WL 1120801, at *6. 
 252. Id. at *2.  For example, in the In re Netflix Privacy settlement, the trial court granted 
preliminary approval of a $9 million wholly charitable settlement stemming from claims that 
Netflix unlawfully retained and disclosed private customer information.  The class 
constituted approximately 62 million claimants. See id. at *1.  Thus, the parties argued any 
distribution of the settlement fund would be de minimis, at best. See id. at *7.  Nonetheless, 
objectors challenged the settlement, arguing instead that the settlement should provide 
individual compensation. See id. at *11.  Although the court overruled the objections, 
explaining that no other realistic settlement distribution option existed, objectors forced the 
court to spend time and money responding to their meritless challenge. See id. at *12. 
 253. See Restatement (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003). 
 254. See supra Part I.A (distinguishing cy pres, earmarked charitable settlements, and 
wholly charitable settlements). 
 255. McLaughlin, supra note 60, at 465–67 (―Decisions regarding whether the charitable 
purpose of a gift or trust has become ‗impossible or impracticable‘ are based on the 
particular facts of each case, and no precise definition of the standard exists.‖). 
 256. Id. at 467 (―Although some commentators have noted a ‗prevailing conservative 
mood‘ in the approach of the courts to this first step in the cy pres process, others have noted 
that the trend in the case law has been to broaden the circumstances in which cy pres can be 
applied.‖). 
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parties at the time of the contract.257  This definition is not a workable 
trigger for charitable distributions because it is known in advance that 
circumstances will make a distribution to the class members impracticable.  
The remaining trigger terms, ―impossible,‖ ―inefficient,‖ and ―wasteful,‖ 
are also plagued by vague, inconsistent definitions.258 
The lack of an easily transferable, preexisting trigger point for charitable 
settlements highlights the need for more clarity.259  To address this need, 
this Article proposes the following straightforward inequality:260 
2(A)>C 
―A‖ represents the average cost per class member to administer the 
settlement fund.  This variable is appropriate because it changes depending 
on the facts of the case, thus reflecting potential distribution problems.  If 
class members are transient or difficult to locate, administrative costs rise.  
In contrast, clear records facilitating the location of class members lower 
costs.  Multiplying A by two ensures administrative costs are justified when 
compared to the potential monetary gain of consumers.261  ―C‖ is the 
approximate individual consumer distribution.  If the settlement is tiered, 
meaning some class members are eligible for a different distribution 
amount, the formula should apply per tier.  Consequently, some tiers may 
trigger a potential charitable settlement while others do not.262  Assuming 
 
 257. U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 1 (2013). 
 258. See, e.g., JoEllen Lind, The End of Trial on Damages? Intangible Losses and 
Comparability Review, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 251, 315 (2003) (discussing ―competing definitions 
of efficiency‖); William V. Roth, Jr., The “Malmanagement” Problem:  Finding the Roots 
of Government Waste, Fraud, and Abuse, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 961, 964 (1983) (noting 
―no definition of waste fits everyone‘s notion of what constitutes wasteful activity‖); Karen 
A. Russell, Wasting Water in the Northwest:  Eliminating Waste As a Way of Restoring 
Streamflows, 27 ENVTL. L. 151, 163 (1997) (discussing ―the lack of a clear definition of 
waste‖). 
 259. In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 991 F. Supp. 1193, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (―[T]here is 
an appealing symmetry to the proposition that the cost of the distribution should not be 
greater than the amount of the distribution itself.‖). 
 260. This formula stems from Judge Walker‘s decision in In re Wells Fargo Securities 
Litigation. Id.  The case involved remainder, which could be distributed as a second 
distribution or as cy pres.  In approving a cy pres distribution, Judge Walker compared 
administrative cost versus individual distribution, permitting a distribution so long as the 
individual distribution is double the administrative cost. See id. at 1197–98.  Professor Brian 
Fitzpatrick offers an alternative proposal, whereby class counsel receive all settlement 
distributions in cases involving $100 or less in individual compensation. See Fitzpatrick, 
supra note 23, at 2067–71.  His argument has some allure from a deterrence-insurance 
perspective.  Moreover, the Rule 23 Subcommittee‘s recent draft proposed amendments to 
Rule 23(e), which incorporated the $100 threshold. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, 
supra note 22, at 264–71.  But by Professor Fitzpatrick‘s own admission, ―It goes without 
saying that it would be politically difficult for judges to award fees equal to 100% of small-
stakes class judgments even if they had the legal authority to do so.‖ Fitzpatrick, supra note 
23, at 2075.  Thus, this Article‘s proposed inequality triggers a more pragmatic proposal. 
 261. Accord In re Wells Fargo, 991 F. Supp. at 1197 (―The court could simply direct 
class counsel to pay all claimants who are entitled to more than $5.50 from the 
residue . . . [but] the claims administrator would spend $5.50 to send Mr. Casagrande a 
check for fifty-two cents. . . . [Therefore] the line must be set at a higher point than $5.50.‖). 
 262. Different tiers of distribution are fairly common in class action settlements, even for 
cases that do not include sub-classes. See, e.g., Pelletz v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 255 F.R.D. 537, 
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the settlement otherwise satisfies Rule 23(e), if 2(A) is greater than C, a 
rebuttable presumption exists supporting a charitable distribution.263 
For example, take a hypothetical settlement of $250,000 for a class of 
30,000 consumers, with an estimated administrative cost of $100,000, 
roughly $3.34 per class member.  Assume administrative costs come from 
the total settlement fund, leaving $150,000 for distribution.  Class members 
would then receive $5 at an administrative expense of $3.34, creating an 
inequality of 6.68 > 5—triggering a charitable settlement. 
This formula is a fair trigger point for three reasons.  First, it is consistent 
with a generic definition of efficiency as a system that ―exhibit[s] a high 
ratio of output to input.‖264  The administrative costs reflect the input while 
the individual compensation is the output.  Multiplying the administrative 
costs by two ensures the input-to-output ratio is not just marginally greater.  
It reflects individual distributions where the administrative costs involved 
are not justified given the negligible monetary gain to consumers. 
Second, this formula is consistent with one definition of ―wasteful‖ as 
meaning a mechanism that is more expensive than an equally beneficial 
alternative.265  The two relevant alternatives are monetary distributions and 
charitable distributions.  The quality of a particular charity can be assessed 
by its administrative cost ratio, specifically, how much is used for 
administrative overhead versus how many cents per dollar are used to 
advance the charity‘s work.266  For better charities, the ratio is roughly 
2:1—meaning approximately 66 cents per dollar are distributed, while 33 
cents are used on overhead.267 
Building on this, individual distributions in cases that do not satisfy the 
proposed formula are wasteful compared to a wholly charitable distribution.  
Take, for example, a $12 settlement where the administrative cost is $6 per 
consumer and each consumer would only receive $6.  Such a settlement 
 
539 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (involving multitiered settlement in a consumer class action); In re 
Vitamins Antitrust Litig., No. MISC. 99-197 (TFH) MDL 1285, 2001 WL 34312839, at *1 
(D.D.C. July 16, 2001) (discussing settlement involving four separate settlement funds for 
different types of claimants); In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig. (No. II), 186 F.R.D. 403, 416 
(S.D. Tex. 1999) (discussing multiple claimant tiers in antitrust class action settlement). 
 263. The standard for settlement approval goes beyond whether a charitable settlement is 
appropriate and considers the overall fairness of the settlement. See supra Part I.A (detailing 
the settlement approval process). 
 264. Paul L. Tractenberg, Beyond Educational Adequacy:  Looking Backward and 
Forward Through the Lens of New Jersey, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 411, 426 (2008) (looking 
at efficiency in the context of education reform).  This definition is probably closest to 
allocative efficiency. See, e.g., Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Antitrust, Ideology, and 
the Arabesques of Economic Theory, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 284 (1995) (―Productive 
efficiency means the effective use of resources by individual firms.‖). 
 265. See Paul E. Kalb, Controlling Health Care Costs by Controlling Technology:  A 
Private Contractual Approach, 99 YALE L.J. 1109, 1113 n.18 (1990) (―In economic terms, a 
wasteful technology is one whose costs outweigh its benefits or one that is more expensive 
than an equally beneficial alternative.‖). 
 266. See, e.g., Roy Lewis, Check Out Your Charity, MOTLEY FOOL (July 18, 2003) 
(detailing criteria for ―efficient and effective‖ charities), available at http://www.fool.com/ 
personal-finance/taxes/2003/07/18/check-out-your-charity.aspx. 
 267. See id. 
2015] SAVING CHARITABLE SETTLEMENTS 3281 
does not satisfy the proposed formula—nor should it.  If given to an 
adequate charity, 66 percent of the $12 is used for collective good, meaning 
roughly $9 rather than $6.  Thus, the charitable distribution is a cheaper 
alternative that provides the class equal deterrence and access to justice. 
Third, this formula minimizes the potential waste from limiting 
charitable distributions to cy pres remainders.  In class actions where claims 
rates are low, the leftover funds are usually distributed as cy pres 
remainders, but the cy pres amounts are diminished by administrative costs 
that could have been minimized by using a charitable distribution from the 
outset.268  Pearson v. NBTY, Inc.269 provides an example of how charitable 
settlements could prevent waste.  There, the parties reached a $14.2 million 
settlement in a pending consumer class action against Target.270  After class 
notice and completion of the claim process, only $865,284 of the settlement 
fund was distributed to class members, while notice costs were twice as 
much as actual class payouts.271  Rather than spending over $1.5 million in 
claims administration, a larger portion of the settlement could have gone 
directly to a charitable distribution.272 
Admittedly, this formula may be criticized for being too generous or not 
generous enough.  Some may squabble that A should actually be 3(A) or 
.5(A)—and such critiques may have merit depending on the case.  However, 
this test provides a brighter line273 to assess potential charitable settlements, 
while simultaneously maintaining the flexibility courts need to fulfill their 
equitable function in evaluating settlements.274  By coupling this formula 
with a rebuttable presumption, courts can consider the facts of a particular 
 
 268. See, e.g., Diamond Chem. Co. v. Akzo Nobel Chems. B.V., 517 F. Supp. 2d 212, 
214–15 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (distributing approximately half the settlement to a charity after 
individual distributions were made). 
 269. No. 11 CV 7972, 2014 WL 30676, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2014). 
 270. See id. 
 271. See id. at *4. 
 272. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 189–99 (1987) 
(explaining that individuals are indifferent about a potential loss that is minimal in relation to 
his income); Fitzpatrick, supra note 23, at 2067 (―[A] loss of a few or a few hundred dollars 
does not appreciably affect the marginal utility an individual derives from additional 
wealth.‖). 
 273. See, e.g., Novella v. Westchester Cnty., 661 F.3d 128, 145 (2d Cir. 2011) (discussing 
the ―logic and appeal‖ of bright-line rules); Midwest Imports, Ltd. v. Coval, 71 F.3d 1311, 
1316 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing how bright-line rules are ―essential to obtaining compliance 
with the rule and to ensuring that long-run aggregate benefits in efficiency inure to district 
courts‖); cf. Kevin C. Mcmunigal & Calvin William Sharpe, Reforming Extrinsic 
Impeachment, 33 CONN. L. REV. 363, 375 (2001) (―One advantage a bright line rule 
generally has over a case-by-case rule is the comparative cost of administering the rule—the 
time and other resources judges and parties would expend weighing the benefits and costs of 
extrinsic evidence under a case-by-case rule.  A bright line rule is superior on this ground to 
a case-by-case rule precisely because of its simplicity.‖). 
 274. See, e.g., Fermin v. Moriarty, No. 96 CIV. 3022 (MBM), 2003 WL 21787351, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2003) (discussing how rebuttal presumptions provide flexibility); see also, 
e.g., Panhandle Producers & Royalty Owners Ass‘n v. Econ. Regulatory Admin., 822 F.2d 
1105, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (same). 
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case in evaluating the adequacy of a given charitable settlement.275  
Consequently, adopting this trigger would ensure small-stakes claims, or 
cases with other distribution challenges, do not generate unnecessarily 
protracted objections during the settlement approval process. 
B.   Clearer Nexus Requirement 
In addition to trigger requirement challenges, objectors often contest the 
proposed recipient in charitable settlements.  In making this objection, the 
assault is more destructive than constructive; alternative recipients are 
rarely proposed.276  For settlement approval, the test should not be whether 
the proposed recipient is the best possible option,277 as this undermines the 
settlement negotiation process‘s integrity and invites subjectivity.278  
Instead, this section clarifies the standard for determining whether a 
particular organization is the appropriate recipient of a charitable 
settlement. 
To begin, the parties, not the court, should select recipients.  This 
minimizes judicial favoritism and potential conflict of interest 
challenges.279  As Judge Kleinfeld noted, ―The rules of judicial ethics have 
in many forms for over a hundred years prohibited judges from endorsing 
charities, because of the risk that lawyers and litigants will feel compelled 
to contribute to them.‖280  Mostly, this proposal is already in effect for 
charitable settlements.281  Unlike cy pres remainders, which are not always 
 
 275. See generally Joel S. Hjelmaas, Stepping Back from the Thicket:  A Proposal for the 
Treatment of Rebuttable Presumptions and Inferences, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 427, 433 (1993) 
(describing the differences between a rebuttal presumption and an inference). 
 276. See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 8 (2013) (challenging proposed charitable settlement recipient); Nachshin v. AOL, 
LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1037–38 (9th Cir. 2011) (challenging charitable distribution by 
contending ―the charities selected by the parties do not relate to the issue in the case and are 
not geographically diverse‖); In re Mex. Money Transfer Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1031 
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (―The California Objectors argue that the cy pres provisions are not 
‗narrowly tailored.‘‖). 
 277. Lane, 696 F.3d at 820–21 (―We do not require as part of that doctrine that settling 
parties select a cy pres recipient that the court or class members would find ideal.  On the 
contrary, such an intrusion into the private parties‘ negotiations would be improper and 
disruptive to the settlement process.‖). 
 278. See, e.g., In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 172–74 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(―[S]ettlements are private contracts reflecting negotiated compromises.  The role of the 
district court is not to determine whether the settlement is the fairest possible 
resolution. . . .‖). 
 279. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07(c) (2010) (―The court, 
when feasible, should require the parties to identify a recipient whose interests reasonably 
approximate those being pursued by the class.‖); see also In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 180 
n.16 (―The judicial role is better limited to approving cy pres recipients selected by the 
parties.‖); In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 38 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012) (―[H]aving judges decide how to distribute cy pres awards 
both taxes judicial resources and risks creating the appearance of judicial impropriety.‖); 
accord Boies & Keith, supra note 23, at 288 (―First, it is preferable that the parties (rather 
than the court) select the charities that will receive a cy pres distribution and ideally 
articulate such selection clearly in any settlement agreement.‖). 
 280. Lane, 696 F.3d at 834. 
 281. See, e.g., id. at 820–21. 
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anticipated in settlement agreements,282 charitable settlements are identified 
by the parties from the outset and should be included in settlement 
notices.283 
With this foundational point in place, the question then becomes how to 
refine the nexus requirement.  Most courts ensure the proposed recipient:  
(1) advances the objectives of the underlying statutes (the ―objectives‖ 
factor), (2) targets the plaintiff class (the ―targets the class‖ factor), and 
(3) provides reasonable certainty that any member will be benefitted (the 
―reasonable certainty‖ factor).284  However, how courts apply these factors 
varies285—which allows objectors to test if a particular judge may entertain 
nexus challenges.  Clarifying the three factors would simplify the settlement 
approval process for charitable settlements and ensure consistency. 
First, for the ―objectives‖ factor, courts should define this factor broadly 
and consider the objectives of class actions, not just the underlying 
claim.286  Courts should be careful not to narrowly fixate on finding the 
most ideal organization.  As discussed in Part I.A, charitable settlements are 
distinct from cy pres in charitable trusts.  But even for charitable trusts, 
from where the cy pres analogy is drawn, the Restatement Third of Trusts 
 
 282. See, e.g., Better v. YRC Worldwide Inc., No. CIV.A. 11-2072-KHV, 2013 WL 
4482922, at *10 (D. Kan. Aug. 19, 2013) (―By not identifying the proposed cy pres 
recipient, the parties have restricted the Court‘s ability to conduct the searching inquiry 
required to approve such a distribution.‖ (citing Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 867 
(9th Cir. 2012))). 
 283. See, e.g., id. (―[T]he failure to designate a proposed cy pres recipient deprives class 
members of notice and the ability to object.‖); see also Dennis, 697 F.3d at 867 (discussing 
the importance of identifying charitable distribution recipient during the settlement approval 
process). But see In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 180 (―Young contends that the settlement 
notice was inadequate because it did not identify the cy pres recipients who will receive 
excess settlement funds.  His primary concern is that unnamed class members will not have 
the opportunity to object to the selection of the cy pres recipients, who are intended to serve 
as proxies for the class members‘ interests.  While a valid concern, failure to identify the cy 
pres recipients is not a due process violation.‖). 
 284. Though this list is often written in the disjunctive (―or‖ instead of ―and‖), judicial 
application highlights how all three factors are regularly considered. See, e.g., Nachshin v. 
AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011); Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus 
Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 285. Compare New York v. Dairylea Coop., Inc., No. 81 Civ. 1891 (RO), 1985 WL 1825, 
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1985) (detailing wholly charitable settlement that was used to fund 
nutrition-related purposes or programs in the same geographic area as the alleged price 
fixing among milk wholesalers), with In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 
2d 1392, 1394 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (―Courts have expanded the cy pres doctrine to also permit 
distributions to charitable organizations not directly related to the original claims.‖).  For a 
thorough discussion of the Motorsports decision, see generally Robert E. Draba, Motorsports 
Merchandise:  A Cy Pres Distribution Not Quite “As Near As Possible,” 16 LOY. CONSUMER 
L. REV. 121, 142 (2004). 
 286. For example, in Dennis v. Kellogg, consumers claimed Kellogg falsely advertised. 
697 F.3d at 858.  The $5 million proposed settlement included food distributions to charities 
dedicated to feeding the hungry. Id. at 861.  The court noted that ―[t]his noble goal [of 
feeding the indigent], however, has ‗little or nothing to do with the purposes of the 
underlying lawsuit or the class of plaintiffs involved.‘‖  Id. at 866 (quoting Naschin, 663 
F.3d at 1039).  The court continued:  ―Thus, appropriate cy pres recipients are not charities 
that feed the needy, but organizations dedicated to protecting consumers from, or redressing 
injuries caused by, false advertising.‖ Id. at 867. 
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has moved away from ―the next best‖ substitute requirement.  Only ―a 
charitable purpose that reasonably approximates the designated purpose‖ is 
required.287  Courts in the United States and abroad recognize this more 
liberal construction of the cy pres doctrine for trusts.288  In fact, the current 
Restatement‘s comments support a ―more liberal application of cy pres‖ 
that does not require the ―nearest possible‖ substitute but rather ―one 
reasonably similar.‖289  Thus, holding charitable settlements to a higher 
standard than cy pres trusts is highly questionable. 
One alternative is to identify a list of presumptively appropriate 
recipients, which advances the nexus requirement by ensuring a relationship 
between the proposed recipient and charitable distribution.290  Some states 
already have adopted this approach for cy pres remainders.291  If either the 
American Law Institute or the Judicial Conference of the United States 
generated similar lists, parties would have increased certainty about 
proposed recipients.292 
 
 287. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003). 
 288. See, e.g., McDonald & Co. Sec., Inc., Gradison Div. v. Alzheimer‘s Disease & 
Related Disorders Ass‘n, Inc., 747 N.E.2d 843, 849 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (―In equitable 
matters, the court has considerable discretion . . . to fashion any remedy necessary and 
appropriate to do justice in a particular case.‖); A.G. for New S. Wales v. Fulham [2002] 
NSWSC 629 (Austl.); John K. Eason, Motive, Duty, and the Management of Restricted 
Charitable Gifts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 178 (2010). 
 289. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. (d); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 440 (2009). 
 290. See, e.g., Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 2d 939, 946 (N.D. Cal. 2013) 
(explaining how the nexus requirement ensures the recipients ―are not merely ‗worthy‘ 
recipients with ‗noble goals,‘ but organizations and institutions with demonstrated records of 
addressing issues closely related to the matters raised in the complaint‖); Six (6) Mexican 
Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1307 (9th Cir. 1990) (detailing how the 
nexus requirement ensures the settlement is ―guided by the objectives of the underlying 
statute and the interests of the silent class members‖). 
 291. See, e.g., IND. R. TRIAL P. 23(F)(2) (requiring partial distribution of cy pres 
remainders to the Indiana Bar Foundation and the Indiana Pro Bono Commission); KY. R. 
CIV. P. 23.05(6) (requiring partial distribution of cy pres remainders to the Kentucky IOLTA 
Fund Board of Trustees); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.10 (2005) (requiring equal distribution of 
cy pres remainders to the Indigent Person‘s Attorney Fund and the North Carolina State 
Bar); PA. R. CIV. P. 1716 (directing partial distribution of cy pres remainders to the 
Pennsylvania IOLTA Board); WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 23(f)(2) (requiring distribution of 
partial cy pres remainders to the Legal Foundation of Washington). 
 292. In generating a list, a natural starting point is identifying charities that promote 
judicial access, as that is an underlying policy behind all class actions. See, e.g., Safran v. 
United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO, 132 F.R.D. 397, 401 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (―[T]he 
general theory behind class action lawsuits . . . [is] to conserve judicial resources and 
increase judicial access.‖); Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Procedural Vision of Arthur R. Miller:  
A Practitioner‟s Tribute, 90 OR. L. REV. 929, 931 (2012) (―The purpose and function of class 
actions . . . [is] to provide judicial access to investors, consumers, and tort victims whose 
claims, if brought alone, would not survive the expense and delay of solo litigation.‖).  
Preidentified charities listed in state statutes could be included as appropriate for cases where 
class members are geographically concentrated.  Moreover, organizations with broader 
geographic impact, appropriately used for nationwide classes, should be included.  The 
broader category could include the ACLU, the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association‘s Civil Legal Services Division, Legal Services Corporation, and the American 
Bar Association. 
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Next, to clarify the ―targets the class‖ factor, courts should include an 
assessment of the class‘s geographic distribution.293  Currently, both the 
Ninth and Eighth Circuits have expressly incorporated this aspect into their 
nexus tests.294  This geographic factor is a functional one, as it does not 
require the recipient be located in the same place as class members.  Rather, 
it ensures the proposed use of the funds overlaps with the class 
definition.295  For example, in a nationwide consumer class, a California-
based consumer protection institution can still satisfy the nexus requirement 
so long as its work has nationwide impact.296  If, however, the institute only 
worked on California-related questions, it would not satisfy the nexus test‘s 
geographic factor—not because of its location but because of the limited 
reach of its work.297  A narrower definition of the ―targets the class‖ factor 
coupled with the broader definition of ―objectives‖ gives courts flexibility 
in identifying potential recipients while still promoting a nexus between the 
pending litigation and the resulting benefit. 
Last, the ―reasonable certainty‖ factor evaluates the propriety of a 
proposed charitable recipient.  Too often, objectors use this factor as an 
open invitation to reargue that direct compensation must occur before any 
charitable distribution.298  Such arguments should be outright rejected.  
Instead, this factor should focus on the proposed recipient and its plan for 
the charitable settlement. 
 
 293. Superior Beverage Co., Inc. v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 477, 480 (N.D. Ill. 
1993); see also In re Bank of Am. Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 4:99-MD-1264 CEJ, 2013 WL 
3212514, at *4 (E.D. Mo. June 24, 2013), vacated and remanded, 775 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 
2015) (―The geographic scope of the instant case is clear; as lead counsel points out, the 
multi-district litigation was transferred to this district because much of the harm suffered by 
the class was felt by individuals in the St. Louis region. Therefore, a cy pres distribution to a 
regional organization is proper.‖). 
 294. See, e.g., In re Airline Ticket Comm‘n Antitrust Litig., 307 F.3d 679, 683 (8th Cir. 
2002) (describing the geographic nexus requirement); Powell v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 119 F.3d 
703, 705 (8th Cir. 1997) (describing charitable distribution with appropriate geographic 
nexus because the settlement program distributed money to the United Negro College Fund 
for scholarships in the region class members resided). 
 295. See, e.g., In re EasySaver Rewards Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1052 (S.D. Cal. 
2013) (―On the whole, the location of the recipient is less important than ‗whether the 
projects funded will provide ‗next best‘ relief to the class.‘‖ (quoting In re Lupron Mktg. & 
Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 36 (1st Cir. 2012))); Lupron Mktg., 677 F.3d 21 at 36, 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012) (―It is not the location of the recipient which is key; it is 
whether the projects funded will provide ‗next best‘ relief to the class.‖). 
 296. Cf. EasySaver, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 1052 (approving San Diego–based recipient in a 
case involving a nationwide class because ―the funds will directly contribute to the national 
academic dialogue involving internet privacy and security‖). 
 297. Cf. Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting 
charitable distribution in a nationwide claim against AOL where the recipient only benefited 
the Los Angeles area). 
 298. See, e.g., In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1335–36 
(S.D. Fla. 2011); New York v. Dairylea Coop., Inc., No. 81 CIV. 1891 (RO), 1985 WL 
1825, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1985). 
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Preference should be given to charities rated by an independent 
organization.299  Grades of ―C‖ or lower should be presumptively 
inadequate for purposes of Rule 23(e).  Three well-respected watchdog 
organizations that provide such ratings are the American Institute of 
Philanthropy, Better Business Bureau‘s Wise Giving Alliance, and Charity 
Navigator.300  When a charity grade is unavailable, the charity‘s 
administrative overhead costs should be presented to the court.301  The 
court should assess this by considering information on employment 
compensation and administrative overhead—as these amounts indicate how 
much money will actually be used to advance the organization‘s mission.302  
Consequently, preference will be given to preexisting organizations, since 
new ones lack data about administrative costs.303  Thus, in the recent 
Facebook case, where the proposed recipient was a newly formed 
organization, the court was correct in noting, ―we have never held that 
[charitable distribution] funds must go to extant charities in order to survive 
fairness review.‖304  However, under the principles proposed in this Article, 
the court should have interrogated why a new organization was warranted. 
Further, the settlement agreement should lay out how the intended 
recipient will use the money.  To date, courts have been inconsistent on the 
breadth and detail required.  Sometimes generic promises to promote 
consumer rights or research sufficed.305  Parties should provide a detailed 
 
 299. See, e.g., Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, The “Independent” Sector:  Fee-for-Service Charity 
and the Limits of Autonomy, 65 VAND. L. REV. 51, 118 (2012) (discussing charitable 
grading). 
 300. See, e.g., KARL E. EMERSON, STATE SOLICITATION REQUIREMENTS (2006), available 
at 2006 WL 5839022, at *7 (listing these three organizations as the primary private charity 
watchdogs); see also Karen Donnelly, Good Governance:  Has the IRS Usurped the 
Business Judgment of Tax-Exempt Organizations in the Name of Transparency and 
Accountability?, 79 UMKC L. REV. 163, 168 (2010); Jennifer Miller Oertel et al., Proving 
That They Are Doing Good:  What Attorneys and Other Advisers Need to Know About 
Program Assessment, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 693, 699–700 (2013) (detailing Charity 
Navigator‘s rating process). 
 301. This information is publicly available for over 850,000 charities. See GUIDESTAR, 
www.guidestar.org (last visited Apr. 23, 2015) (providing financial reporting on charities, 
including overhead costs).  If a particular proposed charity is not listed, such information 
should still be proffered to the court.  Charities are interested in receiving charitable 
settlement funds. They are motivated to provide this information, so obtaining such 
information should not be particularly onerous. 
 302. See Lewis, supra note 266 (describing how to assess how much was spent on 
program services versus general and administrative costs). 
 303. This is not intended as an absolute rule, as there could be instances where the 
preexisting charity has other problems—such as high administrative overhead or too narrow 
a geographic reach.  But if there is an alternative, preexisting charity that does not raise any 
obvious red flags, the parties should bear a heavier burden to prove distribution to a new 
organization is warranted.  This allows trial courts to consider the organization‘s track 
record, as well as helps to ensure the money received is not exhausted by set-up costs for a 
new organization. 
 304. Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 305. See, e.g., In re Google Buzz Privacy Litig., No. C 10-00672 JW, 2011 WL 7460099, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2011) (approving settlement with distribution for consumer 
protection); In re Publ‘n Paper Antitrust Litig., No. 3:04MD1631SRU, 2009 WL 2351724, 
at *2 (D. Conn. July 30, 2009) (approving charitable distribution to ―charitable institutions 
designed to guard against antitrust injury and protect consumers‖). 
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plan on how to use the money as part of the settlement approval process.306  
This will help the court evaluate whether the recipient has the experience 
and know-how to fulfill the distribution‘s intended purpose.  Minute detail 
is not needed, but the court should be confident the recipient has a plan and 
is well-positioned to execute it.307  Further, requiring continued reports to 
ensure the plan is fulfilled maximizes the benefits derived from charitable 
settlements.308 
Promotion of a clearer nexus requirement assists courts and class 
members.  These revisions provide courts more information to evaluate 
proposed charities and distributions.  This information then can be passed 
on to class members in settlement notices, thus averting wasteful 
objections. 
C.   Calculating Attorneys‟ Fees for Charitable Settlements 
Third, objectors often attempt an end-run attack on charitable 
settlements.  In addition to challenging the distributions, objectors regularly 
challenge fee petitions in charitable settlements, contending money that 
goes to charity should not be included in calculating attorneys‘ fees.309  In 
support, objectors rely on what some courts have called ―red flags‖—or 
factors that suggest a collusive or problematic settlement.  As previously 
listed in Part I,310 these red flags are:  (1) a high percentage of the 
settlement going to charity;311 (2) clear sailing provisions—whereby 
defendants agree not to contest fee awards up to a certain monetary 
 
 306. See, e.g., Lane, 696 F.3d at 822, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013) (discussing how 
the settlement agreement articulated ―exactly how funds will be used—to ‗fund and sponsor 
programs designed to educate users, regulators[,] and enterprises regarding critical issues 
relating to protection of identity and personal information online through user control, and 
the protection of users from online threats‘‖). 
 307. See, e.g., Diamond Chem. Co., Inc. v. Akzo Nobel Chems. B.V., Nos. 01 2118 
(CKK), 02-1018 (CKK), 2007 WL 2007447, at *3 (D.D.C. July 10, 2007) (―In addition to 
arguing about the hypothetical virtues of the proposed Center, Class Plaintiff provides the 
Court with significant concrete detail as to both the mission and the nascent plans for the 
proposed Center.‖); accord Foer, supra note 95, at 89 (discussing proposed best practices for 
antitrust cy pres). 
 308. See, e.g., In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 38–39 (1st Cir.), 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012) (requiring annual reports to the court to ―ensure that the 
cy pres fund is distributed in a way that is both financially sound and comports with the 
interests of the class and that the auditing function will not fall on the district court‖). 
 309. See, e.g., In re EasySaver Rewards Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1053 (S.D. Cal. 
2013); In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. M 07-1827 SI, 2013 WL 1365900, 
at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2013); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 282 F.R.D. 92, 121 
(D.N.J. 2012); In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1367 (S.D. 
Fla. 2011); In re MetLife Demutualization Litig., 689 F. Supp. 2d 297, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).  
These challenges are not limited to charitable distributions.  Rather, generic objections to fee 
petitions are an epidemic in class actions. See, e.g., Spark v. MBNA Corp., 289 F. Supp. 2d 
510, 514 (D. Del. 2003) (―The objector‘s ‗opposition‘ to class counsel‘s fee petition appears 
to be nothing more than an attempt to receive attorneys‘ fees.‖). See generally Greenberg, 
supra note 114, at 950 (detailing meritless objections and the problems they pose to 
enforcement and deterrence goals). 
 310. See supra Part I.B. 
 311. See Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 952 (7th Cir. 2006); Crawford v. 
Equifax Payment Servs., Inc., 201 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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value;312 and (3) reverters, or settlements where unclaimed funds return to 
the defendant.313  If successful in convincing the court to reduce the fee 
award, objectors stand to gain—fee reduction is a basis for objectors to 
request fees of their own.314  Hence, objectors have financial motivation to 
recycle claims that charitable settlements are not beneficial to class 
members.315  As Professor Hay explained, ―Among critics, the contention 
that class members have received too little in a class settlement almost 
always is accompanied by the corresponding charge that class‘[s] counsel 
has received too much.‖316 
Rather than fostering such objections, the better course is to clarify how 
to calculate attorneys‘ fees for charitable settlements.  To begin, when the 
revised trigger and nexus requirements are satisfied, the charitable 
distribution should not alter the attorneys‘ fee evaluation.  Such settlements 
should be treated the same as any other monetary settlement.  A contrary 
position risks underenforcement.317  The next step is revising the ―red 
flags‖ as the current ones do not identify problematic settlements and lead 
to false positives, thus generating unsubstantiated fears of collusion. 
Fee awards are essential for class actions to supplement enforcement of 
key substantive laws.318  The potential to recover fees incentivizes class 
 
 312. Lobatz v. U.S. W. Cellular, Inc., 222 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (detailing the 
alleged dangers of clear sailing provisions); see Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 
F.2d 518, 524 (1st Cir. 1991) (―[L]awyers might urge a class settlement at a low figure or on 
a less-than-optimal basis in exchange for red-carpet treatment on fees.‖). 
 313. In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 785 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 314. See Petruzzi‘s Inc. v. Darling-Del. Co., Inc., 983 F. Supp. 595, 622 (M.D. Pa. 1996) 
(using lodestar analysis, the court noted that the objector ―will only be compensated for 
hours which were expended in a manner that benefitted that class as a whole‖); cf. In re 
Cardinal Health, Inc. Sec. Litig., 550 F. Supp. 2d 751, 753 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (―An objector 
to a class-action settlement is not normally entitled to a fee award unless he confers a benefit 
on the class.‖). 
 315. See Barnes v. Fleet Bos. Fin. Corp., No. 01-10395-NG, 2006 WL 6916834, at *3 (D. 
Mass. Aug. 22, 2006) (―Repeat objectors to class action settlements can make a living 
simply by filing frivolous appeals and thereby slowing down the execution of settlements.‖); 
Spark v. MBNA Corp., 289 F. Supp. 2d 510, 514 (D. Del. 2003) (stating that groundless 
objection by serial objector counsel ―appears to be nothing more than an attempt to receive 
attorneys‘ fees‖); Greenberg, supra note 114, at 963 (―Thus, perversely, professional 
objectors have purely monetary incentives to find even a quibble to raise in opposition to a 
settlement—even as class counsel and the court are bound to ensure that the settlement is 
within the range of reasonableness.‖). 
 316. Hay, supra note 198, at 1433. 
 317. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnston, Reforming State Consumer 
Protection Liability:  An Economic Approach, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 23 (explaining 
how attorneys‘ fees play a role in private enforcement); Fitzpatrick, supra note 23, at 2057 
(discussing that fee awards are a necessary aspect of class actions‘ deterrence potential). 
 318. See, e.g., Ressler v. Jacobson, 149 F.R.D. 651, 657 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (―Attorneys 
who bring class actions are acting as ‗private attorneys general‘ and are vital to the 
enforcement of the securities laws.  Accordingly, public policy favors the granting of 
counsel fees sufficient to reward counsel for bringing these actions and to encourage them to 
bring additional such actions.‖); Laura K. Abel & David S. Udell, If You Gag the Lawyers, 
Do You Choke the Courts?  Some Implications for Judges When Funding Restrictions Curb 
Advocacy by Lawyers on Behalf of the Poor, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 873 (2002). 
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action attorneys to front fees and expenses and undertake risky, complex 
litigation.  As Judge Manning noted: 
If the class members had to file individual suits seeking $100–$1,000 
each and had to pay attorneys‘ fees for each case, they would likely not 
bother, and if they did, they would still receive a pittance if they received 
any money at all.  Congress has elected to allow class actions to create an 
incentive for lawyers to take cases where the recovery of individual class 
members creates a disincentive to file suit.319 
This policy goal is particularly applicable to small sum cases, where but 
for potential fees such claims would likely not be brought.320  Hence, fees 
ward against creating an immunity carve-out, whereby defendants could 
avoid liability simply by keeping individual damages low enough to make 
litigation unrealistic. 
In fact, these policy arguments are partially why most courts, including 
the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits, have considered charitable 
distributions in calculating fee awards.321  As the Third Circuit recently 
explained,  
We think it unwise to impose, as [an objector] requests, a rule requiring 
district courts to discount attorneys‘ fees when a portion of an award will 
be distributed [to charity] . . . .  Nor do we want to discourage counsel 
from filing class actions in cases where few claims are likely to be made 
but the deterrent effect of the class action is equally valuable.322   
While the Supreme Court has yet to address the question, including 
charitable distributions in computing settlement values would be a logical 
extension of prior precedent.  In Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert,323 the Supreme 
Court affirmed a fee application that used the entire settlement to calculate 
fees, even though part of the settlement reverted to the defendant.324  Since 
a reversion can count for calculating fees, a charitable distribution, which is 
more valuable for class members, should as well.325  Hence, in terms of 
 
 319. Murray v. Cingular Wireless II, LLC, 242 F.R.D. 415, 421 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
 320. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1760–61 (2011) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (―The maximum gain to a customer for the hassle of a $30.22 dispute is still 
$30.22.  What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in 
litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?‖). 
 321. See, e.g., Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 423, 437 (2d Cir. 
2007).  In Masters, the court explained: 
The entire Fund, and not some portion thereof, is created through the efforts of 
counsel at the instigation of the entire class. An allocation of fees by percentage 
should therefore be awarded on the basis of the total funds made available, 
whether claimed or not. We side with the circuits that take this approach. 
Id.; see also Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (―Nothing in this case requires departure from the 25 percent standard award.‖). 
 322. In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 178 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 323. 444 U.S. 472 (1980). 
 324. Id. at 480–81. 
 325. That said, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a fair bit of animus toward class 
actions.  Hence, it is possible the Court will distinguish Van Gemert.  As Justice Kagan 
noted in her dissent to American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, ―To a hammer, 
everything looks like a nail.  And to a Court bent on diminishing the usefulness of Rule 23, 
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policy and precedent, including charitable settlements for calculating 
attorneys‘ fees is the proper course.  This ensures the regulatory 
enforcement goals of class actions remain at the forefront of Rule 23. 
Nonetheless, objectors still rely on red flags to challenge such petitions.  
Yet, these red flags are just another vestige of conflating cy pres and 
charitable settlements that results in wasteful false-positives.  These red 
flags need substantial revision to effectively identify collusive settlements. 
First, objectors often contend charitable distributions result in 
disproportionate awards to class counsel, when compared to the amount 
class members receive.326  However, a charity receiving a high percentage 
of the settlement indicates a distribution problem, not collusion.  
Admittedly, with such settlements, class counsel receive more money than 
class members.327  But, this is also true for non-charitable class action 
settlements.  Only the percentage of the attorneys‘ fees compared to the 
overall settlement value is possible indicia of a problematic fee request.328  
No evidence suggests that attorneys receive bigger payouts from charitable 
settlements than other kinds of class action settlements. 
Second, the red flags are not particularly helpful in identifying collusion 
because while a reverter raises the specter of a suspect settlement, a 
charitable distribution does not.  A reverter undermines a defendant‘s 
incentive to support the claims process, which is problematic because 
defendants often possess the essential information to successfully notify 
class members of a pending settlement.329  Moreover, reverters have no 
deterrence benefits.330  In contrast, with a charitable distribution, parties do 
not gain by weakening the settlement notice process and such distributions 
support deterrence.  Consequently, the red flags are suspect because they 
incorrectly treat charitable settlements and reverters as equally 
 
everything looks like a class action, ready to be dismantled.‖ See Am. Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 326. See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 820–21 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 8 (2013); In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., No. 06-MD-1738 (BMC) (JO), 2012 
WL 5289514, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2012). 
 327. See, e.g., Lane, 696 F.3d at 820–21. 
 328. For example, in In re Bluetooth, the court vacated an attorney fee award in an 
amount eight times the charitable distribution. In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2011).  
Even there, however, there was reason to assume collusion.  The court vacated the settlement 
and attorney fee approval, directing the trial court to further evaluate the equity of the 
settlement.  In doing so, the court did acknowledge that the trial court ultimately approved 
the award, noting it ―express[ed] no opinion on the ultimate fairness of what the parties have 
negotiated.‖ Id. at 950. 
 329. Many criticisms of class actions focus on class action lawyers, without discussing 
the role of defendants.  While defendants do not owe a duty to class members, by the time a 
settlement is reached, both class counsel and defendants‘ counsel should have a shared 
incentive to promote the settlement. Cf. Bassett, supra note 208, at 539 (discussing how the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41 applies to both defendants and plaintiffs). 
 330. In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392, 1395 (N.D. Ga. 
2001) (―[T]he substantive policies underlying the statutes upon which the plaintiffs sued 
would dictate a preference for an appropriate cy pres distribution rather than a reversion of 
undistributed funds to the defendant, the alleged wrongdoer . . . .‖ (quoting NEWBERG & 
CONTE, supra note 54, § 11.20)). 
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questionable.  Instead, charitable distributions should be included in fee 
award calculations. 
Third, clear sailing provisions—agreements by the parties not to 
challenge class counsels‘ fee petition—are not necessarily problematic.  
When fee arrangements are negotiated, after settlement resolution and in the 
presence of an experienced mediator, concerns of collusion dissipate.331  
Instead, it is the presence of a reverter that again raises concerns.332  As the 
Ninth Circuit explains, ―The clear sailing provision reveals the defendant‘s 
willingness to pay, but the [reverter] deprives the class of that full potential 
benefit if class counsel negotiates too much for its fees.‖333  The mere 
―willingness to pay,‖ signaled by the clear sailing provision, is not 
particularly helpful for the court‘s assessment of a fee petition, as it invites 
baseless objections. 
Hence, the current red flags do not necessarily help courts identify 
suspect fee requests.  Rather, they provide objectors a legal hook to raise 
red herring arguments.  A better alternative is using preexisting, well-
established criteria for fee awards in class actions generally.  These include:  
(1) the size of the fund created and the number of persons benefited; (2) the 
presence or absence of substantial objections by members of the class to the 
fees requested by counsel; (3) the skill and efficiency of the attorneys 
involved; (4) the complexity and duration of the litigation; (5) the risk of 
nonpayment; (6) the amount of time devoted to the case by plaintiff‘s 
counsel; and (7) the awards in similar cases.334  Charitable distributions 
should be counted in calculating the size of the fund and should not alter 
these other criteria so long as:  (1) the trigger and nexus requirements are 
met; (2) no reverter is involved; and (3) fees are agreed upon after 
settlement fund negotiations are complete and in the presence of a mediator. 
Though modest in design, the proposed alterations to judicial review 
provide substantial teeth for evaluating charitable settlements, thus 
maintaining the integrity of Rule 23(e) while avoiding further 
inconsistency.  When the revised trigger, nexus, and fee guidelines are 
fulfilled, objectors should have to pay to play, making them responsible to 
reimburse the parties‘ time and expenses incurred in responding to generic 
challenges. 
 
 331. See supra Part II.B (discussing why collusion fears are overblown). 
 332. See, e.g., Sylvester v. CIGNA Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 34, 45 (D. Me. 2005) 
(―Specifically, the Court remains troubled by the combination of the reverter clause and the 
clear sailing provision.  In concert, the Court believes that these two provisions give rise to 
inferences that there was a lack of arm‘s length negotiations and a lack of zealous advocacy 
for the Class by Plaintiffs‘ counsel.‖); Ralph C. Ferrara & Riva Khoshaba Parker, Tontine or 
Takeback:  Reversion Provisions in Class Action Settlement Agreements, 62 BUS. LAW. 971, 
979 (2007) (discussing the troublesome ―interrelation of the reversion and clear sailing 
provision‖). 
 333. In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 949. 
 334. See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig., 582 F.3d 524, 541 (3d Cir. 2009); 
Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2007); In re AT&T 
Corp., 455 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting these factors overlap with the criteria for 
evaluating the adequacy of a settlement); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 396 F.3d 
96, 121 (2d Cir. 2005); In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 719 (7th Cir. 2001). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article confronts the erosion of class action procedures.  It takes a 
stand to protect against an attack on settlement procedures that further 
aggregate litigation‘s regulatory purpose.  Charitable settlements offer 
efficient, equitable solutions for cases where individual distributions are 
problematic.  Denying charitable settlements runs the risk of strangling 
small-stakes cases in their cradle:  there is little reason to file a claim if 
there is no realistic way to bring the case to conclusion. 
The case for charitable settlements advanced in this Article accepts the 
assumption that one purpose of class action damages under Rule 23(b)(3) is 
to provide class members individual monetary distributions—but that is 
hardly the sole purpose of class actions.  The argument here is one based in 
reality rather than the abstract.  Sometimes individual distributions simply 
make little sense.  Recognizing this, charitable settlements‘ judicial access 
and deterrence gains far outweigh any imagined theoretical challenges 
against them. 
This Article provides the necessary starting point for saving charitable 
settlements.  Distinguishing charitable settlements from cy pres remainders 
advances scholarly evaluation of these distinct settlement structures.  When 
viewed in isolation, charitable settlements‘ utility becomes apparent.  
Through minor modifications to the criteria for evaluating such settlements 
and accompanying fee petitions, courts can clear the path for charitable 
settlements—a path that saves not only charitable settlements but also 
preserves class actions‘ larger regulatory goals. 
